ECUADOR'S PAN-INDIAN UPRISING

BY LES FIELD



Julio Etchart/Impact Visuals

Quichua women and children march to occupy the lands of an absentee landlord in September. The return of stolen land was at the heart of last year's nationwide uprising.

On May 27, 1990, one hundred and sixty Indians occupied Santo Domingo Cathedral in the heart of the old city of Quito. They demanded the immediate resolution of land disputes in six highland provinces. The takeover marked the beginning of a nationwide uprising which shut down the country for over a week. The uprising was called by the Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador (CONAIE), in the name of the regional federations from the highlands (sierra), the Amazon (Oriente), and the coast. The takeover also marked an end—the end of hundreds of years of life on the political periphery for the 40% of Ecuador's 10 million people who are Indians.[1]

Everywhere the demand was the same: give back the land that once belonged, and still rightfully belongs, to indigenous communities. "The indigenous peoples of this country will continue to struggle until we achieve our rights," CONAIE's president Cristóbal Tapuy declared in a press conference. "We are tired of offers and promises, of being berated and looked down upon. We are prepared now, with our own ideas and our own criteria."[2]

By Monday, June 4, the mobilization had paralyzed the sierra provinces of Bolívar, Chimborazo, Cotopaxi, and Tungurahua (all to the south of Quito), Pichincha (where Quito is located), and Imbabura (north of Quito). The Indians' strategy involved placing large boulders, walls of rock, and tree trunks across the Pan-American highway and other major roads. Within a day, the blockade created spot shortages of certain products in provincial capitals and outlying towns, revealing the country's dependence on native farmers. In the provinces of Chimborazo and Cotopaxi, where Indians were already engaged in open struggle for land with estate-owners (*hacendados*), they took police and local officials hostage. At one point, the governor of Chimborazo was reportedly in the hands of the Indigenous Movement of Chimborazo (MICH). In Cotopaxi, indigenous farmers actually expelled *hacendados* from lands that had been usurped generations ago.

The central government deployed the national police and the army throughout the sierra to roll back the insurrection. Troops in full combat gear swept through the countryside, making free use of tanks, tear gas, nightsticks, and, in some cases, bullets. Police arrested and imprisoned many of the Indians blockading roads, particularly those identified as leaders. MICH leader Oswaldo Cuwi was killed by police in Riobamba, the capital of Chimborazo, even as the government invited the national leadership to negotiate.

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On June 8, President Rodrigo Borja designated several upper-level ministers, including the head of the Agrarian Reform Ministry (IERAC), to negotiate with the native leadership. The Archbishop of Quito acted as mediator and CONAIE vice president Luis Macas was the movement's main spokesperson. Eleven days after the occupation of Santo Domingo Cathedral began, the Indians left the church in a disciplined manner, having cleaned the building thoroughly.

As they departed, Indian leaders released a list of 72 priority land conflicts in the sierra requiring immediate resolution, as well as 16 demands that summarize how CONAIE proposes to end the subjugation of indigenous peoples, particularly in the sierra. [See sidebar p.41] These demands outline a program of land distribution and community economic development, investment in basic infrastructure and the removal of barriers the state bureaucracy places in the way of the indigenous economy, such as debt, lack of credit, regressive taxation, and a punishing price structure for indigenous agricultural products. The 16 points mandate a cultural rights campaign based on bilingual education, indigenous control of archaeological sites and government support for native medicine. The program also envisions an amendment to the Ecuadorian constitution to recognize the country as a pluri-national, multi-ethnic state.

THE CONSERVATIVE QUITO DAILY *EL Comercio* called the uprising "the sixth Indian insurrection"—the others having taken place in 1578, 1599, 1615, 1766 and 1892—and described the succession of rebellions as one on-going battle to regain lost lands.[4] CONAIE, however, has compiled a list of no less than 145 distinct insurrections between 1533, immediately following the Conquest, and 1972, when the regional federation Ecuarunari organized the entire sierra.[4] Indigenous historians cite 12 distinct rebellions in Chimborazo alone and historians of the Cañari people from Cuenca recount repeated attempts to turn internecine Creole conflicts into a struggle for indigenous rights.[5]

Despite a thread of continuity, CONAIE and its constituent organizations view the 1990 uprising as qualitatively different from earlier indigenous resistance, which was "in general, local in character, isolated...in reaction to abuses, in defense of land," and as such vulnerable to the centralized repressive apparatus marshalled by the Ecuadorian state.[6]

When the Spanish arrived, native peoples had been living in the sierra for over ten thousand years. A constellation of small chieftain-states, particularly around the modern cities of Otavalo, Quito and Cuenca, conducted active trade in coca leaves, cotton, bird feathers, gold, potatoes, fine textiles, pottery, and many other commodities, among the three regions of Ecuador (sierra, Oriente and coast) and with peoples in the modern territories of Colombia, Peru, Mexico and Central America. The sierra chieftain-states constructed large earthen pyramids, stone temples, and irrigation works.

Though these hierarchical societies were dominated by powerful families, land was held communally and labor performed collectively (the *minga*). Like communal land, the persistence of the *minga* infuses contemporary indigenous identity with a distinctive vision of social organization. The Inca conquest of Ecuador, approximately 50 years before the arrival of the Spanish, likely maintained communal and collective social institutions, which also characterized the social base of Inca civilizations. By contrast, Spanish subjugation undermined communal land and the *minga*, and severed the relationship between the native leadership and the farmers who comprised the majority of the population.

The Spanish Crown issued land-grants throughout the sierra to prominent conquistador families. The Spaniards then forcibly settled indigenous farmers in colonial towns and instituted a labor-draft (the *encomienda*) to create a workforce for the haciendas they established on confiscated land. The Spanish Crown at times attempted to mitigate the harsher aspects of this neo-feudal system, but *hacendados* continued to dispossess Indian communities of their lands throughout the colonial period and after independence. The communities struggled to maintain traditional social structures, but these dwindled as the decades passed.

From early on, the sierra became a stronghold of subsistence and stagnation. While *hacendados* reinvested their income in the much more dynamic, export-oriented cacao plantations on the coast, indigenous farm families were allowed only tiny plots to cultivate after performing obligatory labor on the hacienda. The sustainable practices of indigenous cultivation, a "science" which utilizes complex systems of crop diversity, crop association, and organic composting, enabled indigenous people to survive the brutality of colonial exploitation. Yet the Spanish deliberately froze the trajectory of indigenous technological and economic development, even though sierra towns and cities depended on the produce that Indians brought to market. This dependence, which expanded in the intervening centuries, lay at the heart of CONAIE's strategy during the uprising of 1990, and provided a crucial advantage for the movement.

The only dynamic sector of the indigenous economy in the sierra that the colonial administration maintained and exploited was the ancient textile industry at Otavalo.[7] The Incas had prized Otavaleño textiles, and soon after the Spanish Conquest, the colonial administration built enormous primitive factories in the town. These produced the clothes that garbed the slaves who toiled in the mines of Bolivia and Peru. The factories also made the uniforms of the armies of independence in the early nineteenth century.

CONAIE's historical rendering of national independence relates that "the creation of the Republic of Ecuador did not mean any change in our living conditions; it was nothing more than the passage of power from the hands of the Spaniards to the hands of the Creoles."[8] Today Indians commonly describe independence as "the last day of despotism and the first day of the same." *Hacendados* yoked indigenous farmers to their estates by debt-peonage (the *huasipungo* system), while free-trade policies allowed cheap machine-made English textiles to flood the country, destroying the export potential of Otavaleño weaving and weakening the internal market.

A century later, however, Otavaleños discovered they could imitate the styles of foreign imports and compete effectively in urban markets, due to the comparative advantage of their underpaid labor. Their growing success beginning in the 1920s—the only departure from the overall picture of indigenous rural poverty—created a model of indigenous capitalism and exercised an important influence on the political platform of Ecuarunari and CONAIE.

OTAVALEÑO WEAVERS BEGAN BY INVESTing their tiny profits in new, inexpensive synthetic dyes, as well as in any machinery they could afford.[9] Successful weavers then began a long-term policy of using their small profits to purchase farmland for their families. By buying land with whatever funds they could amass, the Otavaleños resolved the underlying problem confronting them and the rest of the Indians of the sierra: access to farmland stolen by the haciendas.

Otavalo's capitalist development occurred during the same period that small workers' syndicates and artisans' guilds emerged. President Eloy Alfaro, the radical general and nationalist hero of the Ecuadorian Left, aided these anarchist and liberal organizations, which were profoundly influenced by the Bolshevik Revolution. In 1926 radical artisans, workers and intellectuals formed the Socialist Party, which began organizing peasant unions in the sierra, particularly around Quito, and in Imbabura, the Otavaleños' province. These unions (with names like The Inca, Free Land, and Bread and Land) emphasized the struggle for a fair agricultural wage, shorter hours, and improved working conditions.[10]

In 1944 the newly formed Communist Party and the leftist Confederation of Ecuadorian Workers helped indigenous unions, artisan guilds and communities to organize the Federation of Ecuadorian Indians (FEI). "This organization," according to CONAIE, "brought together unions, cooperatives and communities, and for the first time did so in the name of representing indigenous people."[11] FEI limited its activities to the sierra, and

Shuar representative Rafael Pardam at the CONAIE congress in August. CONAIE envisions a national economy based on territorial autonomy and indigenous forms of development.

Melina Silverston

CONAIE'S SIXTEEN DEMANDS

1. Return of lands and territories taken from indigenous communities, without costly legal fees.
2. Sufficient water for human consumption and irrigation in indigenous communities, and a plan to prevent pollution of water supplies.
3. No municipal taxes on small properties owned by indigenous farmers.
4. Long-term financing for bilingual education programs in the communities.
5. Creation of provincial and regional credit agencies to be controlled by CONAIE.
6. Forgiveness of all debts to government ministries and banks incurred by indigenous communities.
7. Amendment of the first article of the constitution to proclaim Ecuador as a multi-national state.
8. Immediate delivery of funds and credits currently budgeted for indigenous nationalities.
9. Minimum two-year price freeze on all raw materials and manufactured goods used by the communities in agricultural production, and reasonable price increase on all agricultural goods sold by them, using free-market mechanisms.
10. Initiation and completion of all priority construction on basic infrastructure for indigenous communities.
11. Unrestricted import and export privileges for indigenous artisans and handicrafts merchants.
12. National legislation and enforcement to provide for strict protection and controlled exploration of archaeological sites, under the supervision of CONAIE.
13. Expulsion of the Summer Institute of Linguistics, in accordance with Executive Decree 1159 of 1981.
14. Respect for the rights of children and greater government awareness of their current plight.
15. National support for indigenous medicine.
16. Immediate dismantling of political party organizations that parallel government institutions at the municipal and provincial levels, and which manipulate political consciousness and elections in indigenous communities. §

struggled for specific agrarian goals: elimination of the *huasipungo*, break-up and return of hacienda land to Indians, a shorter workday, and the like.

Because FEI's program did not "take into account the totality of our problems, that is both class exploitation and ethnic discrimination," according to CONAIE, "and because most of [FEI's] leaders were not indigenous, this organization could not...represent the totality of our aspirations."[12] FEI's success, aided by the Communist-led Federation of Peasant Organizations (FENOC), encouraged a parallel effort on the part of the Ecuadorian Federation of Catholic Workers, in an attempt to limit the growth and influence of the Communists. The net result was an insistent wave of pressure for land reform, which peaked in the 1960s. Under the added incentives of the Alliance for Progress and the Cuban revolution, the military overthrew the democratically elected government in 1964, vowing to both fight communism and carry out land reform.

The agrarian reform law of 1964 focused on promoting farm efficiency, and did not set a maximum allowable farm size. The military agreed with the *hacendados'* assessment that the real inefficiency in sierra agriculture lay in the tiny size and subsistence nature of indigenous farms. The reform became a way to help large landowners develop dairy and meat industries to feed the growing urban population. It did abolish the *huasipungo*, which meant the end of the paternalistic domination of the *hacendados*. The law also promised to distribute hacienda lands to former *huasipungeros*, but failed to do so in the vast majority of cases.

The agrarian reform legitimized native demands for land, while it frustrated the expectations of indigenous farmers. Only in Otavalo did the reform help to change conditions of rural poverty. Indigenous weavers, liberated from the onerous *huasipungo*, augmented their production of textiles significantly. Dovetailing with the slow but steady increase of foreign tourism in the late 1960s, which created a ready-made market for Otavaleño textiles, the process of indigenous capital accumulation and investment in farmland accelerated.

The failure of agrarian reform undermined FEI's class-based ideological platform in the eyes of indigenous farmers. But seasoned FEI activists went on to play a significant role in the building of new ethnically defined and locally based indigenous organizations, culminating in Ecuarunari's founding in 1972.

THE SIX INDIGENOUS ETHNIC GROUPS OF the Oriente began organizing a region-wide movement in the late 1960s, when petroleum gushed from wells drilled in their rainforest territories.[13] Only then did these peoples, who utilize sophisticated sustainable systems to cultivate the fragile rainforest soils, confront an Ecuadorian regime determined to confiscate their lands. Their movement, the Confederation of Indigenous Amazonians (CONFENIAE), and the local federations that comprise it

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Since the 1990 uprising, indigenous people, like these women from the village of Salasca, have faced a campaign of police intimidation and harassment.

reject the ecologically destructive extractive industries the Ecuadorian state and economy have imposed in the Oriente, and seek to obtain title to the territories Oriente peoples have inhabited for centuries.

The military has maintained a strong presence in the Oriente since a conflict with Peru in the 1940s led to the loss of over half of Ecuador's claim in the Amazon. The discovery of petroleum delivered a massive prize into the military's hands—since the generals hardly considered the presence of indigenous peoples in the region significant—and inspired another coup in 1972. The junta promised to nationalize the oil industry and carry out reformist development projects with the profits that petroleum produced.

The military's second agrarian reform, announced in 1973, also stressed efficiency and productivity, and allocated funds to promote capital-intensive export crops, accessible only to large land-owners. IERAC, the government's new Agrarian Reform Ministry distributed even less land in the 1970s than the first reform had in the 1960s. Soon thereafter, police in Chimborazo and Tungurahua assassinated two of Ecuarunari's principal leaders, Lázaro Condo and Cristóbal Pajuna. The organization's second congress, in 1975, focused specifically on resisting the state's crackdown and fighting the injustice of the 1973 reform.

Ecuarunari's platform at that time introduced a "class-based conception of the peasant-indigenous movement," and by 1979 it was promoting a program that combined land revindication with bilingual education and cultural rights. It called for waging both economic and cultural struggles in the context of community development efforts.[14] This platform reflected the growing power of the provincial and community-based organizations Ecuarunari had set out to create. Ecuarunari's ideological platform and increasing emphasis on grassroots control set the organizational tone for both the Orient's CONFENIAE and the national CONAIE.

In the Oriente, petroleum development greatly improved access to rainforest terrain, allowing thousands of mestizo farmers to carve out agricultural plots in indigenous domains. The military junta viewed this as an opportunity to alleviate the "land shortage" in the sierra, and put IERAC in charge of a colonization program. Notwithstanding increasingly clear signs that mestizo farmers did not know how to utilize rainforest soils in a sustainable fashion, IERAC continued to support colonization. The oil companies (both foreign and national) and IERAC accepted the presence of U.S. missionaries among the six indigenous ethnic groups of the Oriente, in the hope that they could "civilize" indigenous societies, particularly by reducing indigenous peoples' attachment to their land.

To combat the open conspiracies against their lands and cultures, in 1980 a meeting of organizations representing the two largest ethnic groups of the region—the Quichua-speakers in the north and the Shuar in the south—founded CONFENIAE. The Quichua-speaking peoples, descended from sierra people who had fled to the east during the colonial and republican regimes, inherited a long history of successful violent resistance to Spanish and Ecuadorian penetration of their territory. Their resistance limited government activities to extractive industries such as gold mining and rubber tapping. In the southern Oriente, the Shuar successfully repelled all Spanish and Ecuadorian incursions into their territory until the last years of the nineteenth century.

In both regions, indigenous organizations seek to title their land, to protect their cultures from predatory missionary groups—particularly the infamous Summer Institute of Linguistics (SIL)—and to fight against the succession of ecologically ruinous extractive industries that reached their nadir with oil. Oriente peoples' revulsion against missionary activity thrust their demand for the expulsion of SIL onto CONAIE's list of 16 points presented during the 1990 uprising. Ecuarunari and CONFENIAE gave birth to CONAIE in 1986, after six years of experimenting with looser and less effective forms of coordinating indigenous struggles nationwide.

AS NEGOTIATIONS DRAGGED ON THROUGH the summer of 1990, the social democratic administration of President Rodrigo Borja expressed optimism that the dialogue with Indian leaders was advancing, and that the restitution of indigenous farmland confiscated over 400 years would be resolved. Gonzalo Ortiz Crespi, secretary to the president, displayed a positive attitude toward CONAIE's demands, and took pains to describe "how much land we have distributed and how much money we have already spent on infrastructure" in Indian communities.[15] CONAIE director Rodrigo de la Cruz expressed guarded skepticism, citing the case of Chimborazo, where the government had done nothing about the landlessness of Ecuador's most impoverished Indian farmers.

In late August, CONAIE and CONFENIAE introduced a new document outlining an ambitious program of territorial autonomy and community development for the indigenous peoples of the Oriente province of Pastaza. CONAIE's previous negotiating positions demanded only the return of land confiscated over the centuries, particularly in the sierra. The Pastaza plan explicitly demarcated proposed territories for the four resident Indian ethnic groups. The proposal reserved for them approximately 90% of the land and its sub-soil resources, confining mestizo Ecuadorians to one corner of the province, around the provincial capital, Puyo. CONAIE vice president Luis Macas justified the allocation and titling of most of Pastaza to indigenous peoples by invoking "the total validity of traditional rights" of Indian people to territories they have inhabited for thousands of years.[16]

President Borja denounced the proposal and brought the negotiations to an abrupt end. He claimed that the document was really a master plan for creating a "parallel state" within Ecuador's borders, in which national laws would have no power over "traditional rights." The president appeared particularly incensed over CONAIE and CONFENIAE's request that the government discontinue oil exploration in the indigenous territories of Pastaza and elsewhere in the Oriente, where the vast majority of Ecuador's sizeable petroleum deposits lie.

"We are not trying to erode Ecuadorian sovereignty," Macas responded, but rather establish "space to develop our communities in a collective form, in order to prevent an exodus of Indians from the Oriente to the cities, as has occurred so tragically in the sierra." The document defined autonomy as necessary to "stimulate our own model of development using traditional techniques within the ecological equilibrium, using what modern technology can offer." Macas stressed that the titling of indigenous lands should be communal, because individual plots "in no way favor the small farmer."

Since the demise of direct negotiations, a campaign of police intimidation and government harassment has attempted to return Ecuador to politics as usual. In the sierra, the secretary general of the Federation of Indigenous Farmers of Imbabura was assassinated in May by "paramilitary squads" organized by *hacendados*, according to Juan Díaz Picuasi, a local leader in that province. Numerous other sierra leaders were imprisoned by the

police, and some have been killed. In several disclosures to *Hoy*, the liberal daily affiliated with Borja's own party, which generally sympathizes with the indigenous position, Macas cited specific instances in which the army has militarized indigenous communities and impeded political activities.[17] The government then opened the door to oil exploration in Yasuni National Park, an ancient species refuge in the Oriente, rich in endemic plant and animal life.

But the cat cannot be put back in the bag. Rather than retreating from their initial political platform of land reform, cultural rights and economic development, CONAIE's leadership, particularly Luis Macas, aims to go farther, to "delineate a political alternative for the transformation of all of Ecuadorian society."[18] Their vision is fundamentally new: a national economy determined by uniquely indigenous forms of economic development, and a politics of territorial autonomy and self-determination which contemplates neither separatism nor the seizure of state power. As such, it stands apart from the traditional postures of both Marxists and revolutionary nationalists.

The community-level organizations that make up CONAIE's rank and file plan to pursue land acquisition and community development by recreating institutions of communal land and collective labor. Given CONAIE's decentralized organizational structure, its overall strategy will be determined by the results of such local experimentation. These could pave the way for the transformation of the country from the bottom up, or presage repression the likes of which this small nation has never seen.

Five hundred years after the Conquest, building dynamic indigenous economies and reviving indigenous language, culture and social organization would be difficult even without the racist opposition of national elites and the studied ignorance of political parties. Having survived into the twentieth century to forge a compelling political and economic vision, the indigenous peoples of Ecuador can already claim a victory which the conquistadors would never have imagined possible. §

References

Think Locally, Act Globally

1. Carole Nagengast and Michael Kearney, "Mixtec Ethnicity: Social Identity, Political Consciousness, and Political Activism," *Latin American Research Review*, Vol. V, no. 2 (1990), p. 80.

2. This estimate is based on a number of micro studies and conversations with academics who are following the subject. See, for example, James Stuart and Michael Kearney, *Causes and Effects of Agricultural Labor Migration from the Mixteca Oaxaca to California* (San Diego: University of California, Program in U.S.-Mexican Studies, 1981).

3. According to Peruvian anthropologist Teófilo Altamirano, at least a thousand Quechua shepherds from central Peru have settled in Nevada; he found over 60 Andean cultural organizations in the United States. Teófilo Altamirano, *Los que se fueron. Peruanos en Estados Unidos* (Lima: Pontifica Universidad Catolica, 1990). In 1990 alone 328,000 people left Peru, of whom 132,000 came to the United States. Most of them were "students" (a classification more indicative of age than anything else) or "workers." A sizeable number of these are probably Quechuas. See *Latin American Weekly Report*, no. 31 (Aug. 15, 1991).

4. Guillermo Bonfil Batalla, *Utopia y Revolucion: El Pensamiento Politico Contemporaneo de los Indios de America Latina* (Mexico: Editorial Nueva Imagen, 1981).

5. Regarding class formation among native peoples, see Serge Gruzinski, "The Net Torn Apart: Ethnic Identities and Westernization in Colonial Mexico, Sixteenth-Nineteenth Century," in Gundieri, Remo, F. Pellizzi, and S.J. Tambiah (eds.), *Ethnicities and Nations: Processes of Inter-ethnic Relations in Latin America, Southeast Asia, and the Pacific* (Austin: Univ. of Texas Press, 1988); Alicia Barabas, *Utopias Indias: Movimientos Socioreligiosos en México* (Mexico: Grijalbo, 1987); Alberto Flores Galindo, *Buscando un Inca: Identidad y Utopia en los Andes* (Lima: Instituto de Apoyo Agrario, 1987); Steve Stern (ed.), *Resistance, Rebellion, and Consciousness in the Andean Peasant World, 18th to 20th Centuries* (Madison: Univ. of Wisconsin Press, 1987); William Taylor, *Drinking, Homicide, and Rebellion in Colonial Mexican Villages* (Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press, 1979); Stéfano Varese, *La Sal de los Cerros: Una Aproximacion al Mundo Campa* (Lima: Retablo de Papel, 1973).

6. See NACLA this issue for population; for earlier data on population and language groupings, see Guillermo Bonfil Batalla, *Utopia y Revolucion*.

7. There has been a long native tradition of criticizing the Euro-American academy's approach to historical and cultural studies. One contemporary Quechua thinker put it this way: "In our analysis, we don't only use class contradictions, but also 'contradictions of civilization'... there are three concentric chains that colonize our people: class oppression, that of the nationalist Creole and acculturated mestizo state, and lastly the oppression of civilization that the West has imposed on the Andean world.... We use Marxism exclusively as a valuable tool. The principal error that Peruvian socialists commit... a result of the absence of indigenous cultural identity and the presence of an embarrassing Western cultural identity among the Creoles and mestizos in their ranks... is to confuse the tool with their identity... and even using a foreign ideological tool as a crutch for their identity." Javier Lajo Lazo, "Ni Utopismo Andino, Ni Socialismo Mágico: Descolonización Ahora," *Wiñay Marka* (Barcelona), no 15 (mayo 1991). For a systematic indigenous critique of Eurocentric social science, see: Wankar, *Tawantinsuyu: Cinco Siglos de Guerra Qheswaymara contra España* (Mexico: Nueva Imagen, 1981); Guillermo Bonfil Batalla, *Utopia y Revolución*.

8. Tomás Huanca, "Relaciones Interétnicas Andinas: Condianeidad de los Grupos etnico-Culturales en Bolivia," (unpublished mss.), 1991.

9. See the studies of Henry Lefebvre, *L'Etat* (Paris: Editions 10/18, 1974); S. Varese, "Multiethnicity and Hegemonic Construction: Indian Plans and the Future," in Gundieri et al., *Ethnicities and Nations*.

10. A clear example of this trend is the growing militarization of the drug war in the Andes.

Aymara Past, Aymara Future

1. Carlos Mamani Condori, "Historia y prehistoria: ¿Donde nos encontramos los indios?," in *Presencia Dominical* (La Paz), March 1987.

2. The government reported 13 dead, 10 injured and 21 imprisoned. The Justice and Peace Commission, however, recorded at least 80 dead and missing, and even more wounded and imprisoned; men, women and children. Comisión de Justicia y Paz, *La masacre del valle*, (La Paz: Cuadernos Justicia y Paz No. 2, 1975). See also, Silvia Rivera *"Oppressed but not Defeated": Peasant Struggles among the Aymara and Qhechwa in Bolivia, 1900-1980* (Geneva: United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, 1987), p. 121.

3. See, for example, Brooke Larson, *Colonialism and Agrarian Transformation in Bolivia: Cochabamba 1550-1900* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988) and Gustavo Rodriguez and Humberto Solares, *Sociedad oligárquica, chicha y cultura popular* (Cochabamba: Editorial Serrano, 1990). See also Silvia Rivera, *"Oppressed But Not Defeated."*

4. Of Bolivia's seven million people, at least 1.5 million are Aymara and 2.5 million are Quechua — a clear Indian majority. Aymara is spoken by 48% of the residents of La Paz.

5. Therese Bouysse Cassagne, *La identidad aymara. Aproximación histórica, Siglos XV-XVI* (La Paz: Instituto de Historia Social Boliviana, 1987), pp. 101-128.

6. Some call this "dual and segmentary organization." See Karl Troll, "Las culturas superiores andinas y el medio geografico," *Allpanchis*, no. 15 (1980); John Murra, *Formaciones económicas y politicas del mundo andino* (Lima: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, 1975), and "Andean Societies," *Annual Review of Anthropology*, no. 13 (1984). See also Tristan Platt, "Symmetries en miroir: le concept de *yanantin* chez les Macha de Bolivie," *Annales E.S.C.* No. 33 (1978).

7. See J. Szemenski, *La utopia tupamarista* (Lima: Pontifica Universidad Catolica del Peru, 1983), Bouysse, *La identidad aymara*, p. 304, who views the Incas as "colonizers" vis-a-vis the Aymara, just as the Aymara "colonized" the Uru.

8. *Pacha* is "time-space," and *kuti* is "turn" or "revolution." As with many Andean concepts, *pachakuti* can take on different shades of meaning, in this case either "catastrophe" or "renovation."

9. Nathan Wachtel, *Los vencidos. Los indios del Peru frente a la conquista española, 1530-1570* (Madrid: Alianza Universidad, 1976), pp. 140-141. The destruction of the indigenous world is eloquently described by Incan chronicler Felipe Guáman Poma de Ayala (Waman Puma) in *El primer nueva crónica y buen gobierno*, trans. and ed. by John V. Murra, Rolena Adorno and Jorge I. Urioste (Mexico: Siglo XXI, 1980).

10. Nathan Wachtel, *Los vencidos*, pp. 269-291; and Szeminski, *La utopia tupamarista*, pp. 125-126. Szeminski maintains the *pachakuti* corresponded to "sometime between the outbreak of the civil war between Ataw Wallpa Inka and Waskhar Inka and the beheading of Thupa Amaro Inka in 1572." He notes, moreover, that the Spanish Viceroy Toledo "was called Pacha-Kuti by the Indians."

11. This phrase is taken from Fernando Mires, *La colonización de las almas: Mision y conquista en hispanoamérica* (San Jose: Departamento Ecuménico de Investigaciones, 1987). In a broad sense, the term can be used to describe not only religious colonization, but many other mechanisms (such as education, or the notion of "civilization") used by the dominant elites to undermine Indian identity and impose a Western world-view.

12. See Frank Salomon, "Ancestor Cults and Resistance to the State in Arequipa, ca. 1748-1754," in Steve Stern (ed.) *Resistance, Rebellion and Consciousness in the Andean Peasant World, 18th to 20th Centuries* (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1987); see also Teodoro Hampe Martínez, "Continuidad en el mundo andino: los indígenas del Perú frente a la legislación colonial (s. XVI)," *América Indígena*, Vol. 45, no. 2 (1985).

13. These are Aymara terms. *Nayra* means ancient, in the past, but also eye, or vision. *Ch'ullpa* means pre-historic or pre-Inca. See Silvia Rivera, "El mallku y la sociedad colonial en el siglo XVII," *Avances*, no. 1 (1978). The role of these settlement and sale agreements in twentieth-century Indian resistance has also been addressed in Taller de Historia Oral Andina, *El indio Santos Marka T'ula, cacique principal de los ayllus de Qallapa y apoderado general de las comunidades originarias de la república* (La Paz: Ediciones del Taller de Historia Oral Andina, 1988); and Rivera et al., "Pedimos la revisión de límites: un episodio de incomunicación de castas en 1918-1921," paper presented at the Simposio sobre reproducción y transformación de las sociedades andinas (Quito: Social Science Research Council, July 1986).

14. From the Pablo Zarate Willka rebellion of 1899 to the revolt of the *caciques* in 1914-1932, that vision would muster violent opposition to the assimilative Liberal reforms which the Creole elite implemented in 1874. See Ramiro Condarco, *Zarate, el "temible" Willka: Historia de la rebelión indígena de 1899* (La Paz: Talleres Gráficos Bolivianos, 1982); Tristan Platt, *Estado boliviano y ayllu andino* (Lima: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, 1982); and Carlos Mamani, *Taraqu 1866-1935: Masacre, Guerra y "Renovación" en la biografía de Eduardo L. Nina Qhispi* (La Paz: Aruwiyiri, 1991).

15. See especially Alberto Flores Galindo, *Tupac Amaru II, 1780* (Lima: Retablo de Papel, 1976). The work of Polish historian Jan Szeminski is one of the best efforts at reconstructing the perspective of the rebels. See also Stern (ed.), *Resistance, Rebellion and Consciousness*; Scarlett O'Phelan, *Un siglo de rebeliones anticoloniales. Peru y Bolivia 1700-1783* (Cuzco: Centro Bartolomé de las Casas, 1988).

16. See, for example, Leon Campbell, "Ideology and Factionalism During the Great Rebellion, 1780-1782," in Stern (ed.), ibid; and Luis Durand Florez, *Independencia e integración en el plan politico de Tupac Amaru* (Lima: P.L. Villanueva, 1973).

17. This idea is evident in many Aymara myths, which describe the reconciliation of the irreconcilable. See Jan Szeminski, "Why Kill the Spaniard? New Perspectives on Andean Insurrectionary Ideology in the 18th Century," in Stern (ed.), *Resistance, Rebellion, and Consciousness*.

18. Szeminski, *La utopia tuparamarista*, p. 80. This view is shared by many Marxists, which helps explain the rift between leftist organizations and indigenous movements.

19. Quoted in ibid, p. 41.

20. Included in this legacy are the mestizos and *cholos*, whose ambiguous position as colonizers/colonized formed a conflictive bond between the two segregated worlds, creating new alliances for each.

21. Similarities to the practice and ideology of "low intensity warfare" are more than coincidental. With respect to the theme of massacre, emerging Aymara historiography has made important contributions. See Carlos Mamani, "Historia y prehistoria," and Roberto Choque, *Sublevacion y masacre de Jesus de Machaqa* (La Paz: Chitakolla, 1986).

22. Demands regarding education showed this ambiguity. See, for example, Carlos Mamani, ibid; Taller de Historia Oral Andina, *La escuela indígena, ¿Colonización o ciudadanía?* (La Paz: Aruwiyiri, 1991); and Silvia Rivera et al., *¿Ciudadanía o soberanía? Cuatro ensayos sobre el colonialismo interno de Bolivia* (La Paz: Aruwiyiri, forthcoming).

23. For more details, see Silvia Rivera, "Liberal Democracy and Ayllu Democracy in Bolivia. The Case of Northern Potosi," *Journal of Development Studies*, Vol. 26, no. 4 (1990); Juan Felix Arias, "Milenarismo y resistencia anticolonial: el movimiento de Apoderados Espirituales en la region de Icla-Tarvita (1936-1964)," unpublished mss.

24. See, for example, Movimiento Bolivia Libre, *Repensar el país* (La Paz: s.p.i., 1987) or Xavier Albo, *Por una Bolivia diferente. Aportes para un proyecto histórico popular* (La Paz: Centro de Investigación y Promocion Campesina, 1991).

25. See Szeminski, *La utopía*, p. 181, and Wachtel, *Los vencidos*, p. 290.

Miskitu: Revolution in the Revolution

1. This article has benefitted from discussions with Carol Smith, Galio Gurdián, Carlos Castro and Jorge Matamoros, and from the institutional support of the Center for Research and Documentation of the Atlantic Coast (CIDCA).

2. The term "coast people," or the Spanish equivalent *costeños*, refers to members of all six ethnic groups who live in the Atlantic (or Caribbean) coastal region: Miskitu, Sumu and Rama Indians; Creole and Garifuna Afro-Nicaraguans; and mestizos. Correspondingly, "Sandinista *costeños*" refers to coast people from any of these six groups who are members, or strongly identified with, the FSLN. Conclusions drawn here regarding the Miskitu should not be taken to apply to coast people in general.

3. Pantin, a university-educated Miskitu formerly affiliated with Moravian Church NGOs, now serves as regional "governor." Vanegas, an ex-commander of YATAMA, is Council president. In addition, Steadman Fagoth, the charismatic anti-Sandinista commander notorious for his authoritarian style and close ties to the CIA, is a close adviser to Pantin on natural resources.

4. NPR reporter Cecilia Vaisman accompanied northern autonomous government officials who were hosting a group of prospective investors, including a man named "Fred...once a US intelligence agent in Southeast Asia. Now suddenly retired, he's investigating the possibility of flying Miskitu coast lobster and shrimp directly to the United States." (National Public Radio broadcast transcript, Sept. 7, 1991) Others interested in gold mining visited in August. They previously had worked in Bolivia, and reportedly had a fleet of small airplanes on hand. Rumors circulated about their connections to the Bolivian drug trade.

5. I am grateful to Hans Petter Bouvolen for bringing these details to my attention. For more information, see his, "Siakni bara Pihini" (*Barricada*, July 5, 1991), and A. Cockburn, "The P.C. Crusade in Nicaragua" (*The Nation*, July 10, 1991).

6. Taken from an interview published in H. Diaz Polanco and G. López y Rivas (eds.) *Nicaragua: Autonomia y Revolución* (Mexico: Juan Pablos, 1986), p. 80.

7. Héctor Diaz-Polanco, who wrote extensively on the ethnic question, and served as a key advisor in the early phase of the autonomy process, was influential in this formulation. See, for example, *La cuestión étnico-nacional* (Mexico: Editorial Linea, 1985).

8. James Dunkerley, "Reflections on the Nicaraguan Election," *New Left Review*, no. 182 (1990), pp. 33-51. Tomas Borge confirmed this point in a recent speech, "Perspectivas de Liberación Nacional en América Latina," in, Heinz Dieterich Steffan (ed.), *1492-1992. La interminable Conquista* (Mexico: Planeta, 1991), pp. 191-204.

9. Quoted in J. Jenkins, *El Desafio Indígena en Nicaragua: el caso de los miskitos* (Managua: Editorial Vanguardia, 1986), p. 396.

10. The Sandinistas could not risk opening their vulnerable eastern flank to U.S.-funded counter-revolution, which sought to separate the coast from the rest of Nicaragua. In addition, the FSLN itself was far from unified on this matter. Proponents of autonomy faced profound skepticism at every level within the FSLN; a more radical version that explicitly spelled out autonomy rights would never have won full FSLN backing.

11. For example, in the text of the law, property rights in the autonomous regions are restricted to "communal property," and other forms "recognized by the Constitution and the laws of the Republic" (Autonomy Statute, Art. 36 and 37). The proposed *reglamentación* would define all territory within the autonomous regions as patrimony of the autonomous government. The difference between these two legal definitions is enormous and fundamental. in the former, the central government retains rights to vast portions of Atlantic Coast lands and resources, which fall outside community boundaries; in the latter, these rights pass exclusively to the autonomous government. Chamorro

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administration officials vehemently oppose the proposed *reglamentación*, and will no doubt argue that it goes against the original intent of the law.

12. The most notorious example of such extra-legal actions was Pantin's signing of a contract with the U.S. company "Caribbean 2000," which allegedly ceded exclusive rights to northern coast marine resources. It provoked an enormous scandal and was quickly annulled. Pantin claims the English-language version of the document he signed was altered without his knowledge, and that he only intended to cede purchasing rights.

13. For more details on this transformation in Sandinista discourse, see C.R. Hale, *Contradictory Consciousness: Miskitu Indians and the Nicaraguan State in the Era of U.S. Hegemony* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, forthcoming), ch. 4.

14. This argument was put forth, for example, in a petition to President Chamorro on Feb. 8, 1991, supported by the north and south regional councils.

15. See, for example, a recent interview with Rivera published in *Wani* (Managua, enero/abril 1991), pp. 52-56.

16. The blanket approval of the original National Directorate at the FSLN congress last July is the most frequently cited evidence of persisting centralism. There are also strong forces within the party favoring democratization. During the same July congress, for example, 60 new people won election to the 98-member Sandinista Assembly—the highest decision-making body of the FSLN—many of them from grassroots organizations. An unprecedented nine Sandinista *costeños* were elected to the assembly.

17. I am indebted to Jorge Matamoros for bringing the full extent of these parallels to my attention.

Maya Nationalism

1. Any time those of us who are part of the dominant, hegemonic culture drown out the voices of the marginal "others" with our own, we are oppressors—regardless of our sentiments or politics. For this reason I have added to my narrative some of the comments Maya made in response to it.

2. Ricardo Falla, "El movimiento indígena," *Estudios Centroamericanos*, no. 351/352 (1978), pp. 437-461.

3. For statements from some of these and other movement leaders, see *Cultura Maya y Políticas de Desarrollo* (Chimaltenango: COCADI, 1989); Demetrio Cojtí Cuxil, *Configuración del Pensamiento Político Maya* (Quetzaltenango: Taller 'El Estudiante,' 1991).

4. Leftists, in fact, often impugn the credentials of Maya nationalists for being a small Indian elite (a petty bourgeoisie), whose grassroots ties are weak. But organic intellectuals of any downtrodden group are almost always separated by their very intellectual pursuits from those they represent. Think of Lenin or Che Guevara. Rigoberta Menchú, who is not a Maya nationalist but an Indian leader of a popular organization, no longer works on cotton plantations. Nor would we hear her if she did. How distant Maya nationalists are from ordinary Maya has to be judged by other criteria—such as how closely their program hews to the needs and interests of those they represent.

5. Prior alphabets for writing Maya languages, produced mainly by the Summer Institute of Linguistics (Wycliffe Bible Translators), were distinct for each language; SIL control of Maya linguistics came to symbolize to nationalists the foreign appropriation of Maya culture. The way SIL used its knowledge to convert and assimilate Maya people, in fact, fueled the nationalist sentiment surrounding the ALMG. See Nora C. England and Stephen R. Elliott (eds.), *Lecturas sobre la Lingüística Maya* (Antigua: CIRMA, 1990).

6. Diane M. Nelson, "The Reconstruction of Mayan Identity," *Report on Guatemala*, Vol. 12, no. 2 (Summer 1991), p. 6.

7. COCADI, *Cultura Maya*, p. 18.

8. COMG, "Derechos específicos del pueblo Maya," (Guatemala: Cholsamaj, 1991).

9. England and Elliott (eds.), *Lecturas*.

10. See the various articles in Carol A. Smith (ed.), *Guatemalan Indians and the State, 1540-1988* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1990).

11. See David McCreery, "Atanasio Tzul, Lucas Aguilar, and the Indian Kingdom of Totonicapán," in Judith Ewell and William Beezley, *The Human Tradition in Latin America: The Nineteenth Century* (Wilmington: Scholarly Resources Inc., 1989), pp. 39-58.

12. David McCreery, "State Power, Indigenous Communities, and Land in Nineteenth-Century Guatemala, 1820-1920," in Smith, *Guatemalan*, pp. 96-115.

13. CISMA, "An analysis of economic variation, development projects, and development prospects in the highlands of western Guatemala," unpublished report to the Inter-American Foundation, 1990.

14. Mario Payeras, *Los días de la selva* (Mexico: Nuestro Tiempo, 1981).

15. Ibid. See also, M. Harnecker, *Pueblos en armas* (Mexico: Era, 1984).

16. See Carol A. Smith, "History and Revolution," in Smith, *Guatemalan Indians*. Ultimately, the kind of revolution Maya sought made little difference to the state. It punished all Maya for simply appearing to threaten state power.

17. See Carol A. Smith, "Local history in global context: social and economic transitions in western Guatemala," *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, no. 26 (1984), pp. 193-228.

18. The issue of cooptation is not a simple matter of corruption. By accepting the terms of discussion offered by the colonial state, the limits and attributes of the movement may come to reflect colonial interaction more than autonomous, localized sources of determination. For how this occurred in India, see Partha Chatterjee, *Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World—a Derivative Discourse?* (London: Zed Books, 1986).

Indian Summer, Canadian Winter

1. For a detailed account, see G. York and L. Pindera, *People of the Pines: The Warriors and the Legacy of Oka* (Toronto: Little, Brown Canada, 1991).

2. A.C. Hamilton and C.M. Sinclair, *The Justice System and Aboriginal People: Report of the Aboriginal Justice Inquiry of Manitoba* (Winnipeg: Queen's Printer of the Government of Manitoba, 1991).

3. Ironically, the Canadian army proved to be a moderating influence. The hawks in the Quebec and federal cabinets kept demanding military action to remove the heavily guarded blockades on the Mercier Bridge and seize huge arsenals allegedly hidden at Kahnawake. The generals simply refused to comply with these commands, aware that a bloodbath would have resulted. The army even went to the point of creating the illusion of an airlift out of Kahnawake to convince the hawks that a major cache of Mohawk weaponry had been removed. See York and Pindera, *People of the Pines*, pp. 333-334.

4. See Menno Boldt and J. Anthony Long (eds.), *The Quest for Justice: Aboriginal Peoples and Aboriginal Rights* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1985); Tony Hall, "What Are We? Chopped Liver? Aboriginal Affairs in the Constitutional Politics of Canada in the 1980's" in Michael Behiels (ed.), *The Meech Lake Primer: Conflicting Views of the 1987 Constitutional Accord* (Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 1989).

5. Hamilton and Sinclair, *The Justice System*.

6. Tecumseh died in combat at Moraviantown in 1813, in the War of 1812, fighting aginst the Long Knives (K'chimokman)—the Americans.

7. The Bloc Québécois represents the movement for Quebec independence at the federal level. The Parti Québécois runs candidates for the provincial legislature (assemblée nationale).

8. The Reform Party is gaining adherents in every province and is expected to run candidates throughout Canada, except Quebec.

Ecuador's Pan-Indian Uprising

1. David Corkill and David Cubitt, *Ecuador: Fragile Democracy* (London: Latin America Bureau, 1988).

2. *El Comercio* (Quito), June 6, 1990.

3. *El Comercio*, June 18, 1990.

4. CONAIE, *Las Nacionalidades Indígenas en el Ecuador: Nuestro Proceso Organizativo* (Quito: Ediciones Abya-Yala, 1989), pp. 295-304.

5. Ibid. pp. 173-174 and 193-194.

6. Ibid. p. 26.

7. Otavalo was called Sarance before the Conquest. See Frank Salomon, *Native Lords of Quito* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986).

8. CONAIE, *Las Nacionalidades Indígenas*, p. 26.

9. Ironically, some of the seed money apparently came from local *hacendados*. See Lynn Meisch *Otavalo: Weaving in the Market* (Quito: Ediciones Libri-Mundi, 1987).

10. One of the government's responses to this incipient mobilization was the 1937 Law of the Communes, which abolished the power of traditional leaders (*curacas*) and substituted government-sponsored town councils (*cabildos*). CONAIE and provincial indigenous federations view this infiltration of the state into indigenous society as particularly heinous. CONAIE, *Las Nacionalidades Indígenas*, p.131

11. Ibid. p. 31.

12. Ibid. pp. 31-32 and p. 276.

13. The six groups, in descending order of population size, are: Forest Quichuas, Shuar, Achuar, Huaorani, Siona-Secoya, and Cofan. Coastal Ecuador featured large, complex and materially wealthy indigenous civilizations at the time of European contact. Plagues and the conquistadors' firearms quickly exterminated coastal cultures. The three small coastal indigenous peoples who survived have also organized themselves into federations and joined CONAIE.

14. CONAIE, *Las Nacionalidades Indígenas*, pp. 216-222.

15. *El Comercio*, June 23 and June 25, 1990.

16. This and subsequent quotes on the Pastaza Document are from *Hoy* (Quito), Aug. 23 and 31, 1990, and *El Comercio*, Aug. 23, 25 and 28, 1990.

17. *Hoy*, Nov. 13, 1990.

18. CONAIE, *Las Nacionalidades Indígenas*, p. 268.

Statement of Owne
1. Title of Publication: Repo
1b. Publication No.: 37050
2. Date of filing: September
3. Frequency of Issue: Febru
3a. No. of issues published a
3b. Annual subscription pric
4. Complete mailing address
New York, NY 10115-0122
5. Complete mailing address
475 Riverside Drive, Rm. 45
6. Names and addresses of
Sauté, Editor—Mark Fried, N
Riverside Drive, Rm. 454, N
7. Owner: North American Co
New York, NY 10115-0122
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C. Total paid circulation
D. Free distribution by mail,
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