


RESISTANCE, REBELLION,
AND CONSCIOUSNESS

7



ON 24 SEPTEMBER 1572 the last Sapa Inca, Tupac Amaru I, left a cell in Colcampata prison to face his executioner in the main square of Cusco. The last remnant of the once proud Inca state, the remote fortress at Vilcabamba, had fallen in June to an expeditionary force dispatched by Viceroy Francisco de Toledo. After the capture of Tupac Amaru and a hasty three-day trial, a Spanish judge condemned the young Inca to death. Despite the efforts of leading churchmen and Cusco's prominent Spanish and Andean families to secure a pardon for Tupac Amaru, Toledo remained determined to carry out the court's sentence. The execution itself was a carefully orchestrated ritual. The Inca emerged from prison in a black robe of mourning, searunning, seated on a mule, with his hands tied and a rope at his neck. The procession from Colcampata to the Plaza de Armas included imported important clerical and lay authorities, a troop of four hundred Cañari warriors, and members of the viceroy's personal bodyguard. Even the choice of Cañari soldiers to accompany the Inca was calculated. These people had remained resolute under Inca rule since their defeat and resettlement from the

North Andes to Cusco, and they had been among the most loyal indigenous allies of Francisco Pizarro.¹ Crowds of Andeans thronged the streets and surrounding buildings to witness and mourn the impending death of their ruler. Once he mounted the scaffold, Tupac Amaru raised his hands to silence the crowd. Then, he delivered a short speech renouncing the Inca state religion and declaring his own conversion to Christianity. At that point, the Inca's Caffari executioner came forward, blindfolded the prisoner, and placed the young ruler's neck on the block. With a single blow the executioner severed Tupac Amaru's head, holding it aloft to the assembled crowd. Within a scant few seconds the bells of the cathedral tolled, and many among the assembled crowd of Andeans began wailing in sorrow.

Although the Inca's body was taken for burial in the city cathedral, Toledo ordered that his head should be displayed publicly, hoisted on a pole. Because so many Andeans had gathered to worship and give homage to their dead ruler, however, the viceroy ordered the head taken down and buried with the body after only two days. Toledo had designed the public execution to symbolize the final defeat and humiliation of the Inca, and the viceroy would not tolerate having the Andeans honor their ruler in death. To Francisco de Toledo, the stroke that decapitated Tupac Amaru I completed the Spanish overthrow of Tawantinsuyu, begun at Cajamarca in 1532.²

Over two hundred years later on 18 May 1781, the main plaza of Cusco served as the scene of another grisly public spectacle, the execution of the rebel José Gabriel Condorcanqui, called Tupac Amaru II after the last Inca ruler. Tupac Amaru II, who claimed descent from the Inca royal family, had led a rebellion against the colonial regime that threatened to expel the Spaniards from the Andean highlands and establish a new Inca empire. On the day of execution, Spanish authorities bound Tupac Amaru and his fellow prisoners in handcuffs and leg irons, tied them to the tails of horses, and dragged them along the ground to the Plaza de Armas. Before his own death, Tupac Amaru was forced to watch the brutal execution of his key followers and

family members, including his wife, Micaela Bastidas, and their twenty-year-old son, Hipólito. After these gruesome affairs, Tupac Amaru was led to the center of the plaza, where the executioner cut out his tongue and threw it down on the cobblestones. He then tied the rebel's hands, feet, and arms to four horses, which were driven in separate directions to pull him apart. The horses apparently lacked the strength for the task, and instead, the poor man remained suspended in air moaning pitifully. Finally, his executioners decided to behead Tupac Amaru. Afterward, they dismembered his body along with those of his wife, son, and uncle. Their remains were sent later to the principal centers of the revolt as a grim reminder of the stakes involved in rising up against Spanish authority. That authority: The rebel's nine-year-old son Fernando was forced to watch the entire ordeal of his family's execution before his expulsion from the Andes to serve a sentence of permanent exile in Africa.³

Between the fall of Vilcabamba and the rebellion of Tupac Amaru II, numerous indigenous revolts and insurrections broke out against abuses of Spanish colonial rule. Some of these revolts were only small-scale, spontaneous outbreaks of violence, while others encompassed entire provinces. During the eighteenth century these uprisings became more frequent, as the Spanish colonial regime attempted to heighten fiscal pressures, exercise closer administrative control over the Andean communities, and impose trade restrictions. All of these policies exacerbated persistent social and economic tensions present in the Andes during the colonial era, ultimately erupting into the rebellions of Tomás Katari, Tupac Amaru II, and Tru II, and Tupac Katari. Between 1780 and 1783 these massive insurrections inflamed much of Peru and Upper Peru, serving as the greatest challenge to Spanish rule since the sixteenth-century revolt of Manco Inca.

During the late colonial period indigenous rebels independently began developing more sophisticated political and social agendas. Sometimes this involved a vigorous assertion of community rights and a greater measure of political autonomy. In other cases, rebels promised to establish a completely new

political order to replace the Spanish colonial regime. Tupac Amaru II, for example, vowed to fulfill messianic prophecies about the return of the Inca, who would expel all corrupt Spanish authorities and found a new kingdom free from oppression and misery. Although these bloody rebellions in the 1780s failed, violent outbursts against Spanish rule continued throughout the colonial era. Later, indigenous soldiers fought actively in the wars for independence, again seeking to advance their own political and social objectives.

Each uprising during the colonial period prompted the production of differing quantities of official documentation, as authorities tried to learn the causes of this unrest and to punish rebel leaders. The quantity and quality of the documentation produced in each upheaval varied, however, depending on the severity of the violence, its geographical extent, and the magnitude of the judicial proceedings in its aftermath. The voluminous documentation produced by the rebellion of Tupac Amaru II (1780–81), for example, provides a wealth of information about topics such as the colonial regime's abuses against indigenous peoples, the stated aims and motives of rebel groups, and the judgments rendered by colonial authorities. Because the Spanish legal system often obliged defendants to answer a series of broad, open-ended questions, trial records can reveal much about daily life, ethnic divisions and rivalries, and Andean concepts of justice. Historians, anthropologists, and specialists in cultural studies have also begun to see violent uprisings as "ritual or cultural episodes," examining patterns of violence, the degree of planning and organization, the use of Christian and traditional Andean religious symbols or icons, and messianic visions of a revived Inca past that may have emerged. In short, these moments of armed revolt provide scholars with unique opportunities to witness patterns of resistance, rebellion, and the evolution of an indigenous political consciousness over time.

Inca Resistance: From Mt. From Manco Inca's Rebellion to the Fall of Vilcabambalcabamba

The establishment of the Inca of the Inca state-in-exile at Vilcabamba had its origins in the rebellion of Mallin of Manco Inca in May 1536.⁴ Within weeks after taking Cusco in 1533, Francisco Pizarro arranged the coronation of Manco as the Sapa Inca to aid the Spaniards in consolidating their hold over Tawantinsuyu. Manco Inca remained a dutiful and loyal puppet-ruler until he grew weary of his allies' greed and arrogance. At that point, the Inca slipped away from Cusco, raised an army of a hundred thousand, and besieged the former capital city. His army defeated and destroyed several relief expeditions, swept the Spaniards from most highland centers between Cusco and Lima and attacked the viceregal capital in August 1536. With the arrival of reinforcements from other areas of the Spanish Indies, however, Francisco Pizarro broke the siege of Lima and gained the military advantage over Manco and his armies. Despite renewing his assaults on Spaniards in the highlands over the next three years, victory eluded the Sapa Inca, and by 1540 he had set up his exile kingdom in Vilcabamba (northwest of Cusco). From there, his troops waged guerrilla attacks on Spanish settlements. Finally, four years later two Spaniards assassinated Manco Inca, and the throne passed to his young son, Sayri-Tupac.⁵

Distracted by periodic civil wars among the conquistadors, Spanish authorities abandoned attempts to invade Vilcabamba, opting instead to negotiate a peace treaty with the Inca kingdom. In 1557 the viceroy, the Marqu es de Ca ete, reached an accord with Sayri-Tupac, who agreed to leave his stronghold and reside in Cusco in exchange for a full pardon and the right to maintain his remote fortress-city. The Sapa Inca also received extensive rural and urban properties and rights to tax revenues. After a visit to the viceroy in Lima, Sayri-Tupac and his large entourage of followers set up residence in Cusco, where he and his coya were baptized as Roman Catholic in 1558 by the bishop. In 1561, however, this compromise unraveled when Sayri-Tupac died

unexpectedly during a visit to his rural estates in Yucay.⁶ The throne then passed to his elder brother, Titu Cusi, residing in Vilcabamba.

Unlike his predecessor, Titu Cusi was not inclined to cooperate with the Spanish authorities, and he renewed guerrilla operations from Vilcabamba, harassing commerce, raiding settlements, and plundering rural estates. Although little is known about socioeconomic organization in the exile community, Titu Cusi's more aggressive policies apparently reflected the ascendancy of a more militantly anti-Spanish faction in Vilcabamba, wedded to earlier militaristic and religious traditions of Tawantinsuyu.

Despite this resumption of hostilities, colonial officials continued trying to negotiate a settlement that would put an end to the independent Inca kingdom. Spanish persistence finally paid off when Titu Cusi agreed to sign the Treaty of Acobamba in 1567. The Inca probably feared provoking a Spanish punitive expedition, so he negotiated highly favorable terms—an annual income, estates and tax revenues, and the right to remain in Vilcabamba. In exchange, Titu Cusi agreed to end hostilities, to accept baptism into the Catholic Church, and to recognize the sovereignty of the Spanish King. Although Spanish authorities continually urged the Inca to leave Vilcabamba, he remained ensconced there until his death in 1571. Then he was succeeded by his more militant brother, Tupac Amaru I, an Andean religious leader who rejected both Christianity and the prospect of peace with Spaniards.⁷

The task of negotiating with Tupac Amaru I fell to Francisco de Toledo, the stern and determined viceroy who viewed Tawantinsuyu as a corrupt, tyrannical, and illegitimate empire.⁸ When his negotiator Atliano de Anaya was killed while on a mission to the Sapa Inca in Vilcabamba, Toledo decided to end negotiations and mount a military force to destroy the indigenous state. Command of the expedition went to a seasoned veteran of the civil wars, Martín Hurtado de Arbieta, who had 250 well-equipped Spanish soldiers in his army. After vanquishing the Inca's troops at the Battle of Coyao-Chaca, Hurtado de Arbieta occupied Vilcabamba on 24 June 1572. Although Tupac Amaru initially

managed to escape the rape the invaders, they eventually captured him trying to flee to the lowland jungle. The victorious army reached Cusco on 21 September, where the Sapa Inca was hastily tried and executed. With the fall of the fall of Vilcabamba and the death of Tupac Amaru, the threat of armed indigenous insurrection diminished. In fact, despite several potential dangerous conspiracies and some relatively isolated revolts by indigenous groups, no large-scale Andean insurrections erupted until the eighteenth century.⁹

Juan Santos Atahualpa and Messianic Rebellion

The first such major uprising against Spanish rule was launched in 1742 by Juan Santos Atahualpa in the jungle zone bordering the central Andean provinces of Tarma and Jaña. This lowland region remained on the frontier of Spanish Peru, where the Franciscan order had begun establishing missions in the late seventeenth century. While some indigeneous groups gravitated to the missions, many others rejected Franciscan efforts to convert, acculturate, and discipline discipline local ethnic groups. Juan Santos Atahualpa, who apparently took his name from the Inca captured by Pizarro at Cajamarca, united these disaffected jungle peoples and some highland migrant migrants into a formidable guerrilla force that repeatedly defeated Spanish efforts to quell the insurrection between 1742 and 1752. 11752.

Although Toledo may have thought the execution of Tupac Amaru I ended the last vestiges of Inca power, Juan Santos Atahualpa utilized the residual appeal of the "lost glory" of Tawantinsuyu by proclaiming himself "Apu Inca" (Inca Lord). Juan Santos, apparently a highly a highlander from Cusco, had received a Christian education from the Jesuits and claimed descent from the Inca royal family. Although his Franciscan critics claimed that Juan Santos was actually a lowborn impostor, his true background remains a mystery. Nevertheless, upon arriving in the jungle settlement of Quisapanango in May 1742, Juan Santos initiated a revolt, ostensibly to reclaim his ancestral kingdom and to

reestablish the cosmic order disrupted by the Spanish invasion in 1532. Juan Santos ordered the expulsion of all hostile Spaniards, blacks, and mestizos, proclaiming that his new order would bring prosperity and peace from the jungle to the highlands and then to the coast. He promised that the revolt would culminate with his own coronation as Sapa Inca in Lima. Juan Santos Atahualpa mixed this nativist-messianic appeal with strong doses of Christian doctrine. Franciscan and Jesuit visitors to his camp remarked how the Inca prayed daily in Castilian, Latin, and indigenous tongues. Although the details of the rebel leader's ideas remain sketchy (largely drawn from hostile Franciscan accounts), they apparently appealed to discontented jungle peoples and some highlanders, and the Inca quickly gained supporters throughout the lowland region known as the Cerro de la Sal.

As the rebellion expanded, Spanish commerce with the lowlands dwindled and Franciscan missionary activities were disrupted, forcing Spanish authorities in Tarma and Jaúja to take military action. When a series of local militia expeditions either failed to locate the indigenous rebels or met defeat, Juan Santos became emboldened enough to expel the Franciscan missionaries from lands under his control. Given these stunning reversals, the viceroy in Lima dispatched a veteran military commander, General José de Llamas, with 850 regulars from the Callao garrison to stamp out the insurrection. Although Llamas had gained a considerable reputation defending the coast against a threatened English invasion, his soldiers experienced repeated defeats against the indigenous forces. By 1747 the Franciscans decided to attempt an ill-fated pacification of the region by simply reoccupying their mission parishes. In March three friars and their escort of ten Spanish soldiers were massacred by local indigenous troops. Another group of three missionaries failed to arrange a truce in the hostilities after meeting with the Inca.

In 1752, Juan Santos Atahualpa decided to launch a bold invasion of the highlands, hoping to spread his messianic message. His troops had made earlier forays into highland

regions, but this time their time the Inca apparently decided to mount an audacious full-scale assault on the Comas region of Jaúja. When his forces quickly took the mountain city of Andamarca on 3 August 1752, local indigenous citizens proclaimed loyalty to "our Inca," rushing forward to kiss his hands and feet. Despite this early success, no huge Inca levy of highlanders rushed to join the Inca's army, and within the three days he retreated to his lowland base of operations. Although he would never mount another serious invasion of the highlands, Juan Santos remained firmly in control of the Cerro de la Sal.

After the Inca's unsuccessful attack on Jaúja, the viceroy turned jurisdiction of these highland provinces bordering the Cerro de la Sal over to military governor Juan Santos, who established a defensive ring of fortresses to contain the rebellion in the lowlands. After Juan Santos Atahualpa died of a disease of unknown causes sometime between 1755 and 1756, the rebellion remained confined to the jungle provinces. Nevertheless, Spanish authorities could not reassert their authority until the 1780s, when missionaries and merchants began returning to the lowland region.

Despite the obvious successes of the insurrection in the Cerro de la Sal, the messianic movement of Juan Santos Atahualpa never garnered widespread support in the densely populated central sierra, the heartland of the former Tawantinsuyu. Several daunting obstacles to a pan-Andean rebellion confronted the Inca. Unlike the loosely governed jungle frontier regions, Spanish authorities had consolidated their political and military power in the sierra, which impeded any widespread revolt. In addition, omnipresent ethnic divisions in the Andes inhibited the possibility of any indigenous alliances made across regional boundaries. Powerful indigenous and mestizo kin networks, such as the Astocuri, the Apolaya, and the Limaylla, also had a vested interest in maintaining the status quo, rather than acknowledging the leadership of Juan Santos Atahualpa, an unknown outsider. Finally, the messianic image of the Inca's return apparently failed to captivate the indigenous popular imagination during this period. For many Andean ethnic groups and their leaders, the

prospect of crowning an Inca king failed to generate much enthusiasm. Indeed, the return of some version of Tawantinsuyu probably promised more of a threat than an imagined utopia.¹⁰

The insurrection of Juan Santos Atahualpa had repercussions even in the viceregal capital, where indigenous leaders conspired in 1750 to rebel, capture the viceregal palace, and gain control of the city. This plot also had messianic overtones. According to one organizer, the seventeenth-century creole mystic, St. Rose of Lima, had foretold of the Inca's return in 1750, making the planned revolt the fulfillment of divine prophecy. Some plotters also favored contacting Juan Santo Atahualpa, offering to crown him Sapa Inca. Others, however, argued for an interim government of local Andean leaders, followed by the selection of a new Inca. Nevertheless, Spanish authorities discovered the plans and on 26 June 1750, they arrested all major conspirators. The only ringleader to escape capture was Francisco Jiménez Inca, who had returned earlier to his home in Huarochiri.¹¹ When Jiménez Inca heard of the arrests, he rallied kinsmen and allies in the province. Within a week, he and his followers had expelled Spanish authorities from all but the provincial mining centers. Twenty days later, however, the rebellion collapsed when a large Spanish military expedition from the mining town of Yuli recaptured Huarochiri and arrested rebel leaders. The short-lived uprising never fulfilled the prophecy of St. Rose, nor had the rebels managed to link forces with Juan Santos Atahualpa. Still, the Cerro de la Sal remained unpacified and simmering discontent in the highlands erupted into periodic small-scale riots and revolts for the next several decades.¹²

The Repartimiento de Comercio and the Spread of Discontent, 1750–80

One of the principal catalysts for discontent in Andean communities before the outbreak of the Great Rebellions of the 1780s was the viceregal government's legalization of the repartimiento de

comercio (or *reparto*) in 1751.¹³ Conflicts over land distribution, tribute rates, *mita* allocation, the succession to ethnic leadership posts, and abuses by local priests and *corregidores* frequently disturbed local indigenous communities during the eighteenth century. The spread of the *reparto* often exacerbated such local tensions, leading to an escalation of violence. The principal aim of the forced distribution of European and American goods and mules was to compel Andean participation in the internal market, as the highland mining economy began its resurgence by the 1740s. Nonetheless, indigenous communities had little control over the types of goods in which goods in each allocation and prices were invariably inflated, often making it difficult for communities to meet both their tribute and *reparto* quotas.

While the legislation of 1751 imposed substantial economic burdens on Andean communities under its jurisdiction, it also provided advantages to at least some colonial interest groups.¹⁴ Before legalization, the region, the repartimiento de comercio had operated informally, but by the 1720s the *corregidores* and merchants began expanding it throughout most of highland Peru and Upper Peru to offset the overall decline in internal commerce. In 1720 the Crown also abolished the *mita* for the *mita* for all but the mines at Huancavelica and Potosí, which curtailed the profits of hacendados, textile mill owners, and most miners. Textile mill owners had benefited from cheap state laborers. By this time expanding imports of European wares also were undermining the pricing of local textiles and other commodities. These trends depressed many local markets, which hurt both regional elites and the Lima merchant community who had controlled the supply of most daily commodities to the interior provinces. Expansion of the *reparto*, however, revitalized the economic prospects of these groups by promoting the circulation of local commodities such as rough woolen textiles, yerba maté (Paraguayan tea), coca, agu, coca, aguardiente, and foodstuffs; the systematic distribution of mules even guaranteed the transport of goods throughout internal trade routes, particularly to the new mining centers of Huantajaya, Hualgayoc, Hualanca, Condorama, and Pasco. Moreover, as Andean communities fell behind in their *reparto* quotas,

they were forced to sell their labor in mines, textile mills, and on Spanish estates, which eased labor shortages occasioned by restrictions on the mita. The repartimiento de comercio also strengthened the local political and economic power of corregidores, at the expense of parish priests and local Andean kurakas, an outcome that dovetailed with the plans of political reformers in Lima, anxious to restrict the influences of religious and community leaders. Nevertheless, creole, mestizo, and Andean producers gained no tangible benefits if they were not involved in supplying commodities for the repartos, because regional markets were often saturated by the forced distributions.¹⁵

The repartimiento de comercio weighed most heavily on indigenous communities already disrupted by a wide array of problems, particularly strife over ethnic leadership. From the mid-seventeenth century the prestige and influence of traditional kurakas (most often called *caciques* by this period) came under attack from groups of entrepreneurial Andean commoners who began challenging hereditary leaders for community leadership. Many of these indigenous businessmen had made considerable sums in commerce, mining, or landholding activities. Their fortunes often eclipsed the sources of wealth available to traditional *caciques*. As a result, litigation in the courts over who had the right to communal leadership positions proliferated. During such local power struggles, local *corregidores* often put added pressure on *caciques* to collect tribute and ensure reparto quotas. Weakened by such internal strife, ethnic lords seldom mounted effective resistance to these powerful Spanish officials, regardless of the consequences for their communities. When they did resist or failed to meet tax and reparto assessments, the *corregidores* usually replaced them with more pliable *caciques*. Frequently these "intruder" *caciques* were outsiders—Andeans, mestizos, creoles, or even Spaniards—who merely served as henchmen of the *corregidor*.

This trend toward replacing hereditary leaders with intruders not only damaged ties of loyalty between *caciques* and their people; it also dramatically weakened and even destabilized the

entire indigenous political order. In one particularly egregious case, Florencio Lupa, *cacique* of the Moscarí people in Chayanta, north of Potosí, used his political influence with the local *corregidor* to gain ethnic leadership over two rival ethnic groups, the Panacachi and the Pocoata. Such a multiethnic union or *cacizaço* was unprecedented and deeply resented by the Panacachi and the Pocoata. Moreover, Florencio Lupa was an unscrupulous and ambitious *cacique* who used intimidation and even violence to impose tribute and reparto allocations on his unwilling subjects. Over time, Lupa became powerful enough to challenge local priests, Spanish landowners, and even government officials. In this way in this way, political pressures accompanying the expansion of the reparto system allowed unscrupulous intruder *caciques*, such as Florencio Lupa, to use their unprecedented political powers to violate traditional indigenous political rights throughout many regions of Peru and Upper Peru.¹⁶

The resulting crisis of political legitimacy prompted a groundswell of litigation before local courts and the audiencias, but when legal recourse failed, many Andeans began turning to violent solutions. Such uprisings were usually small-scale affairs directed against abusive *corregidores*, corrupt local priests, exploitative Spanish entrepreneurial (land owners, miners, or *obrajeros*), and even some *caciques*. Over time, however, these revolts spread over wider areas, becoming more serious challenges to Spanish authoritarianity. One particularly bloody indigenous uprising in Chulumani (in Sumani in Sicasica province, near La Paz) in 1771, for example, arose to protest the exploitative administration of the reparto by a ruthless and ruthless *corregidor*, the Marqués de Villahermosa. Since the local *cacique* and *cacique* was a mestizo ally of Villahermosa, leadership in the revolt passed to two indigenous commoners, Juan Tapia and Mateo Pumahuato Puma. Both solicited funds for the uprising from community members, members, proclaiming that "it was time to free themselves from the oppression of the Spaniards."¹⁷ These leaders of Chulumani first tried to petition the audiencia, but when the *corregidor* refused to comply with the tribunal's order to suspend reparto debts for the region, Tapia and Puma convinced

an assembly of community members to take violent action. The indigenous peoples took up arms and besieged the corregidor in the regional center of Chulumani, erecting a gallows outside the town and promising to punish any “thieves and scoundrels” for their crimes. The rebels also demanded the release of some indigenous prisoners and the withdrawal of Villahermosa and his lieutenant from the province. During the siege of Chulumani, indigenous leaders even organized a shadow government, granting military and political titles to subordinate leaders. When the corregidor’s deputy arrived with a small detachment of reinforcements, however, Villahermosa launched a daring counterattack that scattered the indigenous rebels and ended the uprising.¹⁸

As the rising tide of revolts in Peru and Upper Peru demonstrated, Andeans were increasingly willing to seek violent solutions to abuses of the colonial regime. The breakdown of traditional ethnic political structures, with the introduction of intruders (whether Andean, mestizo, creole, or Spanish) as caciques, only heightened the danger of an uprising. Communities could no longer rely on powerful, respected community leaders to resolve their grievances, particularly when local officials, such as the Marqués de Villahermosa in Chulumani, refused to abide by the decisions of Spanish courts. Violence seemed the only solution. Although these uprisings seldom challenged the Crown, rebels did begin articulating a political agenda that moved from ending oppression to advancing some tentative designs for self-government. It was an ominous portent of things to come in the 1780s.

The Great Age of Andean Rebellions, 1780–83

Bourbon reform policies during the 1770s—particularly changes in trade and mining policies, military organization, patterns of colonial administration, and heightened fiscal pressures—led to an escalation of existing political and social tensions in many regions of Peru and Upper Peru. In 1772, for example, the Crown ordered an increase in the sales tax (*alcabala*) from 2 percent to 4

percent on both colonial and European goods, and a scant four years later raised the rate to 6 percent, making it the highest in the empire. In order to collect these levies more effectively, the viceregal government established customs houses (*aduanas*) in the key cities and placed subplaced suboffices along major trade routes. The Crown also disturbed regionally established trade patterns by removing Upper Peru from the Viceroyalty of Peru in 1776, placing it instead under the jurisdiction of the newly created Viceroyalty of the Río de la Plata, with its capital in Bucotial in Buenos Aires. During this same period colonial officials started taking more accurate censuses of the colonial population, carefully recording the numbers of Andeans to ensure that tribute and other levies were collected efficiently. The net result was a dramatic upsurge in tax revenues, accompanied by regional regional economic downturns that heightened fear and discontent. In some areas, hacendados, textile mill owners, miners, merchants, merchants, muleteers, petty traders, artisans, and Andeans living in urban and rural areas found their economic interests seriously undermined by these reforms. Regional unrest among a wide array of social groups set the stage for a series of revolts between 1777 and 1777 and 1780 in La Paz, Arequipa, and even Cusco. The most serious threats to Spanish authority, however, came from the oppressed indigenous communities of Peru and Upper Peru.¹⁹

Tomás Katari and Unrest in Chayanta

The first phase of the massive Andean rebellions of the 1780s began inauspiciously as a series of legal protests by the Aymara peoples of Macha (in Chayar (in Chayanta province, north of Potosí) seeking redress over abuses in tribute collection and reparto allocations. The leader of this movement was Tomás Katari, an illiterate Andean peasant in his early thirties who spoke no Spanish. Despite his relative youth and humble origins, Katari would inaugurate a remarkable struggle leading to unprecedented claims for indigenous autonomy and political power in the region. Between 1777 and 1780 Tomás Katari led the ten ethnic

communities of Macha in a series of legal confrontations with the corregidor, Joaquín Alós, and his allies among local caciques, parish priests, and the judges of the Audiencia of Charcas. These disputes led ultimately to the expulsion of Spanish authorities from the region, the assumption of power by Katari, and then to a widespread insurrection of the Aymara peoples against the Spanish colonial regime.

The catalyst for the struggles in Chayanta was the repartimiento de comercio, which imposed especially onerous burdens on the Aymara peoples. Ethnic leaders had long controlled the communal assignment of lands, herds, and all tax and labor burdens. In recent decades, however, local corregidores such as Joaquín Alós had imposed abusive reparto quotas and replaced uncooperative community leaders with their own henchmen who seldom had any ties or responsibilities to local indigenous communities. Given the extensive powers wielded by caciques, these intruders threatened the entire political and economic operation of local Aymara communities. To curtail such abuses, in 1764 the Crown had granted the Audiencia of Charcas full authority to resolve complaints brought by Andean communities against their corregidores, but this measure brought little relief. Instead, the move promoted the establishment of informal political alliances between local corregidores and those audiencia judges seeking to share in illicit profits from tributes and reparto allocations.

This cozy arrangement received a potential setback, however, when the Crown transferred Upper Peru to the new Viceroyalty of the Río de la Plata in 1776. Unlike their counterparts in Lima, who were often tied to merchants involved in the repartimiento de comercio, bureaucrats in Buenos Aires had little interest in promoting the forced distributions, which only fostered corruption, indigenous unrest, and the accretion of excessive powers by highland corregidores. Nevertheless, the viceroy and the Audiencia of Buenos Aires lacked the power to redress indigenous complaints, especially when they stood opposed to the interests of corregidores and judges in the Audiencia of Charcas. Instead, the new administrative boundaries created the circumstances for endless

jurisdictional disputes between the government in Buenos Aires and local courts and magistrates in Upper Peru.

Tomás Katari and the Aymara peoples of Macha used widespread fraud in the tribute system to contest the stranglehold over power exercised by local Spanish magistrates. For the people of Macha, tribute assessments and the mita became a powerful political vehicle, because they represented the symbolic link between the Spanish King and indigenous communities throughout the Andes. To the Aymara peasants, meeting these tax and labor obligations guaranteed their control over lands, crops, herds, and the entire body of corporate rights then threatened by Alós and his cronies. Moreover, colonial legislation demanded the immediate removal of any Spanish official cheating on tribute and mita assessments. As a result, the Aymara protesters concentrated their political counterattack on taking Alós and his political allies to court for defrauding the Crown of tribute receipts. In this way, Katari and the other protesters undoubtedly hoped to dislodge the abusive local officials, regain their "rightful" control over community resources, and reestablish a more balanced reciprocal relationship with the Spanish Crown.²⁰

In 1777 and 1778 Tomás Katari and his fellow protesters presented evidence of tribute fraud against Alós before the Audiencia of Charcas and the royal treasury of Potosí. Both bodies initially ordered the corregidor to suspend all intruder caciques and to appoint Katari the tax collector. When Tomás Katari tried to deliver these decrees to Alós in June 1778, however, the corregidor confiscated his documents and had him publicly whipped by the mestizo cacique, Blas Bernal. According to Katari, Alós then stated before the assembled citizens that "he was their absolute corregidor and visitador, and that there were no audiencia or royal official, and if they complained again [before these courts], he would hang them from the stirrups of his horse."²¹ The Charcas and Potosí officials did nothing to challenge Alós and enforce their own rulings.

The protesters at Macha responded to this affront by dispatching Katari on a long, arduous 2,100-mile journey to

Buenos Aires (which lasted nearly three months), where he could register their complaints with the viceroy. After hearing about the outrages in Chayanta, the viceroy ordered the Audiencia of Charcas to appoint a special prosecutor to verify Katari's story and settle the matter according to the law. Nevertheless, when Katari returned to Macha in 1779, the audiencia steadfastly refused to enact the viceroy's order. After suffering arrest by corregidor Joaquín de Alós once again, Katari tried to assume the responsibility for delivering the rightful amounts of tribute to the treasury in Potosí. He hoped this would both assert his loyalty and prove that the lesser amounts of tribute sent by Alós during his tenure had defrauded the Crown. Upon his arrival in Potosí on 10 June 1780, however, Spanish authorities arrested Tomás Katari yet again.

This last detention of Katari triggered an explosion of mass violence throughout Chayanta, as the Aymara peasants took matters into their own hands. When Alós and a local militia contingent came to the town of Pocoata to review the assembly of workers for the annual mita quota to Potosí on 26 August 1780, Katari's supporters attacked and captured the corregidor. The rebels then exchanged Alós for Tomás Katari.

After the bloodshed at Pocoata, the frightened members of the Audiencia of Charcas named Katari cacique of the region. Within three months he had expelled Alós and the magistrates' handpicked caciques, taking complete control over local governance in Chayanta. Katari used his new authority to lower tribute rates, and to abolish both the mita and the repartimiento de comercio. At the same time, Katari ordered all the indigenous towns in Chayanta to remain loyal to the Crown and continue delivering their tribute payments. Nonetheless, as the uprising spread, many communities refused to meet their state obligations. Instead, the rebels took vengeance on local leaders who had been loyal to Alós, executing Florencio Lupa (the controversial and powerful cacique of the multiethnic union of Moscarí, Pocoata, and Panacachi) and Blas Bernal, who had whipped Katari in June 1778.²²

The viceroy in Buenos Aires became so alarmed by affairs in Macha that he removed jurisdiction over the region from the Audiencia of Charcas and appointed a military governor, Ignacio Flores, to settle the uprising. Nevertheless, before Flores could take command, the audiencia sent troops to ambush and capture Katari in December 1780. En route to his incarceration in La Plata, his Spanish escort apparently murdered Tomás Katari, pushing him off a cliff.²³

With the death of Tomás Katari, rebellion engulfed Chayanta and the surrounding provinces. Led by Katari's brothers Dámaso and Nicolás, the rebels assaulted towns throughout the region, executing anyone who had participated in their brother's murder or who had abused Andean Andeans. In 1781 the Aymara army even attempted an unsuccessful siege of the city of La Plata, but within a year, Spanish troops had defeated them. Crown officials then executed the leaders and scattered the remaining rebel troops. Nonetheless, what had begun as a series of legal protests about tribute and abuses of the repartimiento de comercio ended in a full-scale armed insurrection to overthrow Spanish authority north of Potosí. The rebels' defeat, however, did not lead to the pacification of Peru and Upper Peru.

Tupac Amaru and the Rebel the Rebellion in the Cusco Region

Amidst the unrest in Chayanta, an even more violent and serious insurrection arose southeast of Cusco in Tinta (also called Canas y Canchis). Its leader was José Gabriel Condorcanqui, who took the name Tupac Amaru II after the Sapa Inca executed in 1572. The Bourbon Reforms had provoked considerable economic hardship in Tinta, exacerbating both ethnic tensions among Andean communities and conflicted leadership positions. The corregidor, Antonio de Arriaga de Arriaga, added to these problems through his heavy-handed administrative of tribute and reparto assessments, earning the enmity of many indigenous communities. He had even run afoul of the bishop of Cusco, Juan Manuel Moscoso y Peralta, in a series of jurisdictional disputes with

clergyman, leading the prelate to excommunicate Arriaga on 27 July 1780. Condemned by the church and hated by many in Tinta, Arriaga continued his abusive and tyrannical rule until Tupac Amaru's followers captured him on 4 November. The rebel leader then intimidated the frightened magistrate into handing over twenty-five thousand pesos in tribute receipts and a cache of arms. On 10 November 1780, before approximately four thousand onlookers, Tupac Amaru declared that he had orders from King Charles III condemning the corregidor. Tupac Amaru commanded that Arriaga be stripped of his sash, sword, and his staff of office, and then sentenced him to death. After hearing this verdict, Arriaga ascended the gallows in the main square in Tungasuca (Tinta's capital), dressed in a penitential robe, to meet his end. Within a few weeks a massive uprising began, which spread from Tinta to Lake Titicaca and later joined with the Aymara rebels in Upper Peru.²⁴

The leader of this insurrection, José Gabriel Condorcanqui, was the son of a prominent cacique in Tinta who claimed descent from the Inca royal family. As a young man José Gabriel had received his education in Cusco at the prestigious Jesuit school of San Francisco de Borja, established for the sons of indigenous leaders. He was also related to many of the prominent families in the region, which was not uncommon in the old Inca heartland, where creole, mestizo, and Andean lineages often intermarried or served as godparents for each other's children. José Gabriel Condorcanqui married the mestiza, Micaela Bastidas Puyucabua, with whom he had three sons. After his marriage, Condorcanqui inherited over 350 mules from his father, which he used to ply the trade route from Cusco to Potosí. This allowed José Gabriel to extend his web of business and personal connections well beyond Tinta. In addition, he owned modest mining interests and some coca fields in Carabaya to the south. Despite acquiring wealth from his varied enterprises, Condorcanqui remained frustrated by his failure to obtain viceregal recognition of his hereditary right to become cacique in Tinta. He even ventured to Lima pleading his case, but to no avail. José Gabriel nurtured a particular hatred for

Antonio de Arriaga, who had sided with Condorcanqui's rivals for ethnic leadership in Tinta, such as Eugenio Sinanyuca. By 1780 José Gabriel Condorcanqui had sufficient cause to oppose Spanish officials, particularly Arriaga, the family lineage to claim ethnic leadership, and the cordón de contacts needed to mobilize a mass rebellion.

Hostilities ensued shortly after Arriaga's death. Utilizing the money and weapons extorted from the corregidor before his execution, Tupac Amaru quickly mobilized an army of several thousand and occupied neighboring Quispicanchis. To counter this threat, Spanish authorities in Cusco raised an army of creole militiamen and then added over eight hundred Andeans, mobilized by the loyal caciques Pedro Sahuaraura and Ambrosio Chillitupa. These troops pursued the rebels to the town of Sangarará, where the Spanish commander, Tiburcio Landa, billeted his troops in the town church to seek refuge from an impending snowstorm on 17 November 1780. The soldiers posted no sentinels, and at four in the morning they awoke to find themselves surrounded by Tupac Amaru's indigenous army. The rebel leader ordered all creoles, all creoles, women, children, and clergymen to leave before his troops attacked, but Landa apparently prevented anyone from evacuating the building. The indigenous soldiers then mounted an assault on the church. During the attack, the Spaniards' gunpowder caught fire and exploded. In the fire and the melee that followed at least 576 of Landa's troops lost their lives, including twenty Spaniards. As a sign of goodwill, Tupac Amaru ordered the twenty-eight captured creoles treated for their wounds and released. After this overwhelming victory, thousands more flocked to Tupac Amaru's army, swelling his ranks to over fifty thousand by December. Nevertheless, the bloodbath at Sangarará also frightened potentially sympathetic creoles and prompted Bishop Moscoso to excommunicate his former friend, José Gabriel Condorcanqui-Tupac Amaru.²⁵

Tupac Amaru II used a diverse set of Andean and Christian symbols in forging an ideology designed to attract a broad-based coalition against the colonial regime. He played on the

widespread discontent against local authorities by promising a new political order free of corregidores, Spaniards, and anyone else guilty of exploitation. Tupac Amaru widely invoked the image of the King of Spain, a powerful symbol of unity in the Andes, by declaring that he had executed Arriaga on the monarch's orders and by using the rallying cry of "Long live the king, down with bad government." Like Juan Santos Atahualpa, he also took the title of Sapa Inca, even dressing in traditional royal tunics decorated with the golden sun image and commissioning a painting of Micaela Bastidas and himself dressed like an Inca royal couple. Moreover, the rebel leader self-consciously drew upon popular messianic beliefs, such as the Inkarrí myth, which foretold that Tupac Amaru I would have his decapitated head united with his body underground. Once united in body, the Inca would rise up and return to power, bringing order and social justice to the Andes. By the 1780s such resurrection myths appealed to a wide range of social groups. Many creole and Andean elites, for example, avidly read Garcilaso de la Vega's *Comentarios reales*, which presented a favorable view of Tawantinsuyu. Even the Jesuits, in the Colegio de San Francisco de Borja, where Tupac Amaru received his schooling, displayed portraits of the Inca kings, establishing a linkage for generations of indigenous students between Christian education and a romanticized vision of the indigenous past. Just as Mexican creoles laid claim to an invented tradition that linked the Aztec empire to the founding of a new nation of Anáhuac (divorced from the colonial regime), so too did different ethnic groups in the Andes seize upon the Inca past to imagine a new political future.²⁶

Since the Inca was a religious as well as a secular leader, Tupac Amaru mixed both Christian and Andean religious symbols to bolster his legitimacy. He styled himself "protector of the faith" and "God's chosen instrument on earth," proclaiming that Christianity would be the only religion practiced in his new political order. Tupac Amaru also invoked the prophecies of Saint Rose of Lima predicting a return of the kingdom to its "former rulers." In addition, he utilized traditional Andean rituals, such as holding religious ceremonies on the site of huacas and calling on recruits

to fight for the memories of their dead ancestors. Tupac Amaru clearly envisaged a new multiracial, multiethnic kingdom, and so he formulated a political ideology designed to attract churchmen, creoles, mestizos, indigenous elites, aristocrats, and Andean peasants to his cause.

To implement this eclectic ideological program, Tupac Amaru devised his own concrete political agenda. The Inca called for ending the repatriamiento de comercio and mercio and the hated mita, slashing tribute by 50 percent, stopping restrictive restrictions and taxes on trade, and granting liberty to all slaves. Each of these reforms appealed to a slightly different constituency, but they, taken together, provided a powerful program for a new state headed by the Inca to replace the "morally bankrupt" colonial regime.²⁷

Apart from relying on his religious messianic ideology, Tupac Amaru used kinship, personal, and business connections to forge the rebel army. The Inca's family members—his cousin, Diego Cristóbal Tupac Amaru, his brother-in-law, Antonio Bastidas, his son Hipólito, and of course, his wife Micaela Bastidas—formed his inner circle of advisors. According to contemporaries, the Inca's wife took charge of all logistics in the rebel camp, and she issued orders freely in the commander's name. Tupac Amaru also relied heavily on his family and personal connections throughout Tinta, where he recruited the bulk of his army. Most local cadets supported the rebel cause with varying degrees of enthusiasm, except those few, such as Eugenio Sinanyuca, who were sworn enemies of the Inca and his family. The rebel leader also used his kinship and godparentage (*compadrazgo*) connections to extend his web of followers from Tinta to Quispicanchis. Finally, Tupac Amaru used sympathetic mulattoes to recruit followers and spread news of the revolt along the trade route from Cusco to Potosí, where he had worked for so long. Indeed, once the rebellion spread beyond this network of connections in Tinta and Quispicanchis, Tupac Amaru found it much harder to recruit enthusiastic supporters.²⁸

The command structure of the rebel army generally reflected the hierarchies of Cusco's diverse regional society. Among those leaders later prosecuted by colonial authorities, there were

nineteen Spaniards and creoles, twenty-nine mestizos, seventeen Andeans, and four blacks or mulattos. Apart from a few large landowners, the bulk of these rebel leaders were members of the colonial middle class—farmers, scribes, urban tradesmen and artisans, muleteers, caciques, and a few school teachers. Moreover, Tupac Amaru organized his army along the lines of the colonial militia, with the highest command positions going to creoles, prominent mestizos, and caciques. Mestizos or Andeans usually held intermediate ranks, while the overwhelming bulk of the army's rank and file were indigenous tributaries or forasteros. Most noncombatant staff positions went to creoles, Spaniards, and close family members. In short, the army was essentially an elitist rather than a populist organization, following the Inca's political program of attracting a broad-based social coalition.²⁹

Despite Tupac Amaru's efforts to fashion an ideology and a military structure capable of uniting regional society against the colonial regime, his support among the creole upper classes quickly eroded. After the bloodbath at Sangarará, most creoles shrank from the reality of facing a new political order backed by large numbers of bloodthirsty indigenous soldiers intent on taking revenge against the Spaniards, whom they called *puka kunkas* (red necks). These fears turned to panic as reports of atrocities against all "white" men, women, and children—creoles and *puka kunkas*—poured into Cusco. The indigenous hordes allegedly beheaded adult Spaniards and creoles, drank their blood, cut out and consumed their hearts, ripped out tongues, pierced eyes, removed genitals, dismembered bodies, raped women, and murdered babies. Although some ritual mutilations had deep roots in Andean warfare, all such actions clearly contravened the orders of Tupac Amaru and his commanders to spare innocent citizens, especially creoles. The available evidence, however, indicates that the Inca's poorly disciplined troops most often directed their rage against those most guilty of oppressing the indigenous peoples: *corregidores*, *puka kunkas*, and those creoles associated with *reparto* and tribute abuses. Nonetheless, rebel soldiers also killed many innocent victims

during the bloody conflict. Whonifict. Whether acts of violence represented more radical efforts among the rebel army to turn the conflict into a race war, or merely the excesses of battle-hardened troops, such atrocities undermined the Inca's efforts to build a broad coalition by pushing frightened creoles to support the royalists.³⁰

After his decisive victory at S victory at Sangarará, Tupac Amaru moved the bulk of his army to the Lake Titicaca region, hoping to consolidate his gains and prevent any royalist attacks from Puno and Arequipa. He also sought to swell his ranks with recruits among the Colla peoples, where he had political and family connections. Meanwhile, his wife and chief advisor Micaela Bastidas tried to collect basic supplies and arms and arms in Tinta for the final assault on Cusco. By 6 December, however, Micaela Bastidas scolded the Inca for delaying too long, warning that his rebel troops were getting restless. She urged him to attack Cusco immediately before the royalist forces could organize properly, adding ominously: "I see your lack of enthusiasm about such a grave affair is putting everyone's life in danj life in danger."³¹

Upon his return from the south on 16 December, Tupac Amaru belatedly heeded his wife's advice and prepared for an attack on Cusco. By that point, however, rebel defeats in Quispicanchis had already eroded the aura of invincibility surrounding the Inca and encouraged the Spaniards defending the city. Moreover, Tupac Amaru's siege plans quickly went awry, as Spanish troops prevented his army from surrounding Cusco. Efforts to negotiate the city's surrender further delayed any military action. Finally, on 8 January 1781 the Inca attacker attacked with a force of thirty thousand from the north, trying to cut the defenders off from grain-producing valleys supplying the city and from the road to Lima. When Spanish defenders impeded his advance, the Inca suddenly decided to withdraw two days later. Apparently, Tupac Amaru had hoped to take the city without major bloodshed, and with his troops dangerously short on food and arms, he decided against attempting a protracted sieged. After this major setback, the military momentum shifted to the colonial forces, as the rebels limited themselves largely to guerrilla operations.

With the failure to take Cusco, the political and military fortunes of Tupac Amaru plummeted. The class and ethnic tensions within the movement began surfacing with greater intensity. Apart from the loss of creole support, many Andean leaders from outside Tinta rallied to the royalist cause. Large indigenous forces under the command of powerful caciques hostile to Tupac Amaru, such as Mateo García Pumacahua (from Chincheros, north of Cusco) and Diego Choqueguanca (from Azángaro) joined with Spanish and creole reinforcements from Lima and neighboring provinces. By February, Tupac Amaru's forces had retreated to his command center in Tinta, where a Spanish army from Cusco, under the command of José del Valle, surrounded the rebels. When his troops failed to break out of this encirclement, the Inca and his family fled to the town of Langui. With a 20,000-peso bounty on his head, Tupac Amaru was captured on 6 April 1781. He was then taken to Cusco and executed, leaving what remained of his army under the command of his cousin, Diego Cristóbal Tupac Amaru.

Julían Apasa-Tupac Katari and the Aymara Rebellion

After the defeat and capture of the Inca, Diego Cristóbal led his rebel forces into Upper Peru, where they took Puno in May 1781 and established connections with Aymara rebel forces in Chayanta and La Paz. After Tomás Katari's death in January, command of the revolt in Chayanta had passed to his brothers, but in March another large rebel force operating in the La Paz region fell under the control of an illiterate Aymara-speaking forastero, Julían Apasa. The ascendancy of Apasa was assured when Spanish authorities captured and executed Dámaso Katari in late April, and then just over a week later his brother, Nicolás Katari, was killed in the battle of Chuquisaca. Although Julían Apasa always acknowledged the superior authority of Diego Cristóbal and the Cusco faction, he generally maintained his own independent sphere of authority among the Aymara-speaking troops around La Paz. Apasa even began calling himself the

"viceroxy" Julían Tupac Katari, pac Katari, which roused the ire of the Cusco leaders.³² Nevertheless, after Tupac Amaru's death, the primary military theater of the Great Rebellion had shifted from Cusco to Upper Peru.

Although born of very humble origins in Sicacica, Julían Apasa moved boldly and forcefully to head the Aymara rebellion in La Paz. According to his wife, Bartolina Sisa, he had been active organizing an indigenous rebeuous rebellion in the region at least two years before the outbreak of Tupac Amaru's revolt. Apasa was a small-scale trader in coca and rough and rough woolsens, and by 1780 he had established a network of family and business connections throughout the region. With the outbreak of hostilities in Chayanta and Cusco, Julían Apasa apparently attempted to identify himself with both Tomás Katari and Tupac Amaru to legitimize further his claims to leadership. He took the name Tupac (meaning brilliant in Quechua) from the Cusco Inca leader and Katari (indicating serpent or snake in Aymara) from the influential Chayanta rebel. Indeed, some reports claimed that when he arrived in the La Paz area, Julían Apasa even wore a veil or mask to cover his face, pretending to be the reincarnation of Toniton of Tomás Katari. Apasa also claimed to have letters from Tupac Amaru and even a royal edict from the King giving him command of the La Paz forces. His efforts were further aided by the absence of any rival creole or indigenous leaders. Unlike Tupac Amaru's uprising, the Aymara revolt in Upper Peru always remained a peasant movement, giving strong, charismatic men from humble origins, such as Apasa and Katari, a greater opportunity to assume leadership roles.³³

Julían Tupac Katari epitomized qualities associated with a traditional Aymara warrior, whiarrior, which helped him maintain a tenuous hold over his poorly disciplinly disciplined peasant soldiers. This was important because he lacked the commanding physical presence of Tupac Amaru; the Aymara leader was apparently of medium stature, with twisted arms and arms and legs (probably resulting from a childhood disease or malnutrition). Despite this deformity, like Aymara warrior-leaders from the mythical past, Tupac Katari displayed unpredictable outbreaks of violence, bouts of

drunkenness, legendary carnal appetites, and an excessive concern with the trappings of honor and respect. According to the Quechua commander, Miguel Bastidas (also called Miguel Tupac Amaru), Apasa displayed a "fury and desire to kill all whites and Spaniards," and he even directed his fearsome anger against his own troops, who "looked upon him with terror because of the liberty with which he . . . dispatched so many Indians when they opposed him."³⁴ Despite the disapproval of Bastidas, such behavior fit the image of a strong indigenous leader, attempting to whip up a blood lust against the enemy and seeking to maintain discipline among poorly trained troops. Even Tupac Katari's propensity for drunkenness and lustful behavior probably increased his standing with the rank-and-file soldiers. Among Aymara peasants, drinking was part of indigenous religious ritual (often used to connect with sacred powers), while proving his sexual virility also demonstrated Tupac Katari's physical power, which resembled that of impulsive deities from Andean mythology. Their leader's concern with wearing fine clothes, keeping a large store of coca and chicha, and taking numerous honorific titles such as viceroy, also conjured up popular notions of a proud but fearsome warrior. Moreover, when Apasa dressed in the trappings of the Sapa Inca, like Tupac Amaru, he sought to reinforce his messianic appeal and legitimacy.³⁵

Tupac Katari also promoted a curious mixture of Christian and Andean rituals to bolster his leadership of the movement in La Paz. At his camp in El Alto, he supported a coterie of priests to celebrate mass, lead processions, and administer the sacraments. Nevertheless, many Christian observers ridiculed Katari's declarations that he was sent from God and that his followers would rise to life after dying in battle. These same critics mocked Tupac Katari's penchant for consulting a "silver box" during mass and for making faces into a small mirror, which he claimed allowed him to predict the future. While these acts confounded Spaniards, creoles, and Tupac Katari's more hispanicized indigenous observers, they probably made more sense to his peasant soldiers. Many Aymara peoples believed that mirrors represented

"eyes" that allowed holy men to communicate with divinities and predict the future. Likewise, his silver box apparently contained small ritual objects (called *champi* in Aymara or *conopas* in Quechua). To his peasant tripeasant troops, performing these traditional Andean rituals during mass (wing mass (when Jesus was said to be present in the consecrated host) merely st) merely demonstrated Tupac Katari's ability to draw on spiritual powers from both Christian and Andean religious traditions. Like most. Like most of his soldiers, Tupac Katari felt free to mix these rituals, while still asserting sincerely that "I am as Christian as anyone else."³⁶One else."³⁶

Despite his supposed "hatred for all whites," Tupac Katari apparently wanted his troops to avoid a bloody race war and forbade using arbitrary and discriminatory violence. According to Gregoria Apasa, the sister of Ju sister of Julián Tupac Katari, "it is certain that they killed Spaniards, because, because the Indians overstepped themselves, Julián only ordered that they kill some."³⁷ There is also evidence that the Aymara soldymara soldiers imposed their own limits on the bloodshed. They most often directed their anger selectively, against those Crown officials, n officials, peninsulars, and creoles deemed guilty of oppressing the people, the people. They also targeted mestizos, caciques, and Andeans if they dressed in Spanish clothing or had collaborated with the royalistthe royalists. When Quechua and Aymara troops took the provincial capital of Sorata, for example, they first ordered all males who had fought against them put to death. Nevertheless, the rebels namebels named a creole as town magistrate and then ordered all Spanish, creole, and mestizo women and children to change into Andean garb and chew coca. Symbolically this act of transformed these "outsiders" into legitimate members of the indigenous community. In other cases, however, Aymara soldiers killed all the rich and powerful in a captured community, while sparing poorer citizens, which gave the rebellion the character of a class war. Like the uprising in Cusco, both loyalist and rebel soldiers committed numerous atrocities against their opponents and even innocent civilians. The widespread bloodshed reflected the bitterness of what can best be viewed as a civil war in the La Paz region, which pitted supporters of the colonial

order against an Aymara peasant army dedicated to destroying it.

Cases of atrocities committed by Aymara soldiers also stemmed from the fragile control exercised by Tupac Katari over his army. The Aymara peasant army was more decentralized than either the Quechua army (of Tupac Amaru and his successors) or loyalist forces, which intensified the problem of maintaining discipline. Katari tried to rely on kin, friends, and business allies to fill leadership positions, but his movement attracted few among the traditional ethnic leadership. Instead, Katari felt compelled to consult large, representative war councils to gain support for his military plans during the siege of La Paz. In all likelihood, this lack of discipline and organization probably prompted many of Tupac Katari's well-documented outbursts of temper against his troops and his use of floggings and capital punishment against disobedient commanders, subalterns, and rank-and-file soldiers. In short, the Aymara movement was always more loosely organized, democratic, diverse, and difficult to control.³⁸

Although the kinsmen of Tupac Amaru nominally led the rebellion, relations between the Quechua and Aymara commanders were often strained. The Cusco leaders and Tupac Katari had to speak through interpreters, and disparaging comments directed by Miguel Bastidas-Tupac Amaru and the others from Cusco against Tupac Katari indicate the suspicion and friction felt on both sides. In May 1781, Diego Cristóbal, Miguel, and Andrés Tupac Amaru operated largely from their base in Puno, while Tupac Katari busied himself with attempts to take La Paz. The first siege of the city lasted 109 days until July 1781, when a loyalist army commanded by Ignacio Flores arrived to relieve the city. In mid-August, however, a mixed Quechua and Aymara army under the joint command of Tupac Katari and Andrés Tupac Amaru laid siege a second time. This effort too failed after seventy-five days, when a large Spanish force under José Reseguín arrived. After the failed sieges of La Paz, the war turned against the rebels and the Quechua and Aymara commanders barely consulted with each other. Relations soured further as Tupac Katari began emphasizing racial solidarity among

his Aymara followers, which ers, which damaged the Cusco leader's efforts to forge a broader-based ethnicized ethnic coalition.

With the war nearly lost early lost and the two camps divided, leading members of the Tupac Amaru Tupac Amaru clan decided to abandon their Aymara allies. Andrés transferred command of his army to Miguel Bastidas, while he and Diego and Diego Cristóbal opened negotiations in Azángaro with the Spanish authorities to arrange a pardon for their entire family. By 3 November 1781, these efforts led Bastidas to surrender the entire Quechua army and accept the government's terms for a pardon, which Diego Cristóbal pointedly emphasized, "did not include [ot include Julián Katari, who is independent of this family line."³⁹

Tupac Katari was unaware of this betrayal, and he kept his troops in the field, hoping to unite forces with the Quechua army and continue the revolt. When he received word of the pardon and surrender of his allies, Tupac Katari stubbornly urged his followers to persist alone. A few days later, however, the Aymara leader was lured into a trap and captiv and captured. On 14 November 1781 in the town of Peñas, Julián Apasa-Tun Apasa-Tupac Katari was tied by heavy ropes to four horses that pulled in separate directions, ripping his body apart. Like Tupac Amaru before him, the Aymara leader was then decapitated, with his head disps head displayed in La Paz and his remaining body parts sent to several of several centers of the revolt to dampen enthusiasm for any further uprisings against the colonial order.

Enduring Rebellions from 1783 to Independence

In the wake of the three great Andean rebellions, colonial authorities implemented wide-ranging reforms to pacify the rebellious provinces, to heal local divisions, and also to eradicate any vestiges of the upheavals. In a conciliatory gesture, the Crown abolished the repartimiento de comercio in 1780 and three years later issued a general pardon to all but the rebel leaders. Viceregal authorities next moved against anyone suspected of plotting revolt, even arresting those members of Tupac Amaru's

family who had surrendered to gain a royal pardon. In 1783, for example, Diego Cristóbal Tupac Amaru was arrested for conspiring to foment rebellion, tortured, and executed. Over ninety kinsmen of Tupac Amaru were taken to Lima in chains and sent to exile in Spain, only to be shipwrecked in route. The visitor general of the viceroyalty, José Antonio de Areche, and his chief advisor, Benito de Mata Linares, also attempted to stamp out any signs of Inca revivalism. They ordered all paintings that invoked images of Tawantinsuyu destroyed, including those displayed in the Jesuit school of San Francisco de Borja in Cusco. They also banned the circulation of Garcilaso de la Vega's *Comentarios reales*. Both men then tried unsuccessfully to have the Crown abolish the traditional office of cacique, fearing that these indigenous leaders might foment new revolts.

At the same time, the Crown imposed a series of administrative reforms to regain effective political control, and ordered viceregal officials to overhaul the tribute system to raise more tax revenues for the depleted royal treasuries in Peru and Spain. In 1784 royal authorities imposed the intendancy system throughout the Viceroyalty of Peru and transferred the Puno district to the Río de la Plata, where the system had been in force since that viceroyalty's creation in 1776. As part of this administrative renovation, reformers abolished the network of corregidores, replacing them with subdelegates (*subdelegados*) responsible directly to the intendant. The Crown also created a new audiencia in Cusco in 1787, hoping to provide an avenue for legal redress and to diffuse any tensions that might balloon into violent revolt. Finally, the colonial regime undertook a thoroughgoing reform of the tribute system to ease the fiscal exigencies of the nearly bankrupt viceregal treasury. Local officials took ever more accurate census records of the tributary population, closed legal loopholes, and raised tax rates. The net result was a striking upsurge in tribute revenues, particularly in the intendancy of Cusco, already hurt by economic recession worsened by the devastation following the rebellions.⁴⁰ These reforms in the 1780s continued the overall process of weakening indigenous political institutions. Although the Crown

finally decided to eliminate the office of cacique only in those communities that had supported the rebellions, uncertainty about the position's future had damaged the prestige and power of ethnic leaders. Following the lead of their predecessors, the subdelegates often summarily replaced caciques incapable of meeting tribute quotas, often with their mestizo and creole allies, which only aggravated the crisis of indigenous authority. The problem became so obvious that the Audiencia of Cusco eventually prohibited subdelegates from naming caciques in their district in 1798, but the practice continued anyway. Viceregal authorities also deprived caciques of the right to make tribute collections, a task that gradually fell to indigenous mayors (*alcaldes de varayaks*), further dividing and weakening the structure of local authority. Even powerful loyalist caciques frequently found their positions undermined.

Because the Crown never provided them with adequate salaries, many subdelegates and their allies took advantage of political crises within indigenous communities by engaging in corrupt and monopolistic business practices, even imposing outlawed reparto quotas. Subdelegates, intruder caciques, parish priests, and local businessmen often formed alliances to profit from abusing indigenous communities. Controlling the tribute system gave the subdelegates and their allies access to tax revenue, unpaid indigenous labor, and communal and privately owned lands set aside for the needs of the cacique and his ayllu. Without strong ethnic leadership to oppose such economic plundering, Andean communities suffered, particularly when trying to meet ever higher tribute assessments. The devastation of the recent rebellions also undermined local trade, agriculture, and manufacturing, which only worsened the economic distress caused by heavy taxes and rapacious local officials.⁴¹

The exploitation and political turmoil afflicting indigenous communities provoked a rising tide of litigation brought by indigenous plaintiffs before subdelegates, intendants, and the Audiencia of Cusco. These Andean protesters a wide range of abuses, such as the usurpation of land, tribute fraud, coerced

labor, illegal reparatos, wrongful imprisonment of Andeans by local authorities, disputes over succession to cacique positions, and jurisdictional conflicts among local authorities. In all too many cases, however, the courts failed to resolve these nagging local problems.

When recourse to the courts failed or seemed impractical, protests and even small-scale rebellions erupted, usually directed against abusive local authority figures—particularly subdelegates, caciques, and priests. In 1790, for example, a two-day riot broke out in Asillo (Azángaro province) over the appointment of Tomás Mango Turpo as cacique. Although General Ignacio Flores appointed him cacique to reward his loyalty during the Tupac Amaru rebellion, Mango Turpo was very unpopular in Asillo. Before the rebellion Mango Turpo had grown wealthy by forging alliances with former corregidores of Azángaro and had shared in substantial profits from abuses of the repartimiento de comercio. A rival for the post, Manuel Ramos Guaguacondori, fomented rebellion among local community members to prevent Mango Turpo from taking office. Although Spanish authorities quickly crushed the revolt in Asillo, similar outbursts of violence erupted in Andean communities throughout Peru and Upper Peru during the late colonial period.⁴²

These undercurrents of social and political alienation only worsened with the political turmoil in the Andean provinces provoked by the Napoleon Bonaparte's invasion of Spain in 1808. When the French forced King Charles IV and his son Ferdinand to renounce the throne, a crisis of political authority emerged within the Andean provinces. Several creole groups formed local governments (*juntas*) in Quito, La Paz, and other Andean regional capitals, claiming to rule until the resumption of legitimate royal authority in Spain. Although viceregal troops stamped out most *juntas*, the powerful symbol of the King as a unifying element in colonial society had been seriously compromised.

Matters became even more confused when the Spanish Liberal constitutional government in Cádiz in 1812 proposed wide-ranging reforms within the empire. Among the most controversial

were granting representation in the Spanish legislature to Americans, awarding full citizenry to Amerindians, abolishing indigenous tribute levies, and holding local elections for municipal offices throughout the empire. Andean communities differed in their responses to these innovations. The reforms effectively ended the corporate status of indigenous communities, making them subject to losing comprising communal lands and to paying new colonial taxes, such as the *alcabala*. On balance, in those provinces more isolated from market forces the abolition of the head tax appeared to be a boon, because meeting the new burdens would not have amounted to the sums sent in tribute. For communities that participated actively in market exchanges, however, the prospect of paying the full array of sale taxes, tithes, and other duties carried a much stiffer price tag and threatened future economic prospects. Ending Amerindian tribute also imperiled the nearly bankrupt royal treasury. The Viceroy of Peru, José Fernando Abascal, simply refused to abide by this abolition order. Finally, the return to Spain of King Ferdinand VI brought an end to all Liberal experiments in representative government and social reform, as the Crown tried to reestablish the old absolutist colonial order.

During this confused and turbulent era, a serious threat to royal authority erupted in Cusco with the Pumacahua Rebellion of 1814. Unrest in Cusco focused on the dispute between the creole-controlled *cabildo* and the *audiencia*, which represented Spanish interests. Conflicts arose over whether Andeans should vote in local municipal elections, a process that creole factions supported and the peninsulars opposed. After the city council members protested efforts by the *audiencia* to suppress a popular riot in the city in October 1814, the judges ordered the arrest of several members of the *cabildo*. This sparked an uprising of the city's middle and lower classes led by José Angulo, who demanded immediate implementation of the Liberal reforms of 1812. Angulo also called for an end to corruption, bad government, and the heavy taxes levied by Viceroy Abascal to support the suppression of the rebels in Peru and Upper Peru. To broaden

his base of support, Angulo recruited the wealthy, seventy-year-old former royalist cacique, Mateo García Pumacahua, who remained popular in many local indigenous communities. The aging cacique had served a short term as interim president of the Audiencia of Cusco, but his abrupt dismissal by Crown authorities left Pumacahua embittered and susceptible to Angulo's appeals for help.

Given Pumacahua's military reputation and experience, Angulo made him commander of the rebel army, and the cacique soon raised a largely indigenous force of twenty thousand men. The rebels struck quickly and enjoyed some initial successes, capturing several key cities, including La Paz where Pumacahua tried unsuccessfully to link up with a rebel army from Buenos Aires besieging Potosí. At the same time, largely independent indigenous rebellions broke out in the towns of Ocongate and Marcapata (in Quispicanchis). By late 1814, however, the tide began to turn against the insurgents. A mixed Spanish and Andean army under General Juan Ramírez recaptured La Paz and then in March 1815, he decisively defeated Pumacahua's forces. Ramírez had Pumacahua executed on the battlefield before his vanquished troops, and later ordered Angulo and the other rebel leaders hanged for treason.⁴³

Despite the collapse of the Cusco revolt of 1814, indigenous troops continued to fight in the wars for independence in both royalist and rebel armies. Most often, like the troops of Pumacahua, they did so out of loyalty to ethnic leaders or to advance their particular political agendas. As the colonial order finally crumbled, Andeans also sought a place in the emerging nation-states. Nevertheless, independence and the advent of creole-dominated governments yielded few tangible benefits for the embattled indigenous communities. Despite their struggles in the courts and on the battlefield, Andeans failed to realize their hopes for freedom and liberty.

Conclusions

After capturing Cusco in 1530 and 1533, the Spanish invaders slowly attempted to stamp out indigenous resistance in Tawantinsuyu. The eruption of Manco Inca's revolt in 1536 began four years of warfare culminating in the retreat of the Sapa Inca to his fortress at Vilcabamba. Despite progress in negotiations with Manco's successors, Sayri Tupac and Yupac and later Titu Cusi, the rebel state at Vilcabamba remained a potent threat, especially during the periodic civil wars among the conquistadors. For this reason, Viceroy Francisco de Toledo de Toledo launched a punitive expedition to capture Vilcabamba, which succeeded in taking the fortress, capturing Tupac Amaru I, and extinguishing the last center of Inca resistance. The execution of Tupac Amaru I in 1572 effectively ended the Spanish conquest of the Andes. While periodic, small-scale protests and revolts erupted in the seventeenth century, none of these outbursts threatened the foundations of Spanish rule. With the onset of the Bourbon Reforms during the eighteenth century, however, a rising tide of dangerously violent rebellions swept across the Andes.

These reform efforts by the Bourbon dynasty often provoked this violence by exacerbating political and social tensions in Andean communities, particularly the move to legalize the abusive repartimiento de conto de comercio. Although tribute assessments, mita service, and clerical fees might impose hardships, most indigenous peoples accepted them as long-standing obligations to the Crown. When these assessments became too burdensome, Andeans resorted to litigation, protests, and occasionally even revolts to gain redress. The repartimiento de comercio, however, fell outside the traditional pact of reciprocity with the colonial state, and it seriously disrupted local political and social relationships. Enforcing reparto quotas led many corregidores to quarrel with prelates and to replace recalcitrant caciques with intruders—especially mestizos and creoles having no loyalty to local ayllus. Al ayllus. Antonio de Arriaga, for example, managed to alienate Tupac Amaru II by refusing to recognize his

claim to hereditary leadership. The corregidor of Tinta also fought with local clerics, leading to his excommunication by Bishop Moscoso. These ill-conceived policies damaged two pillars of local authority and stability—the ethnic caciques and the Church.

The Bourbon Reforms not only undermined local sources of political and moral power, they also promoted jurisdictional disputes within the colonial bureaucracy, impeding the ability of community leaders and the courts to resolve local disputes peacefully. When viceregal authorities, the Audiencia of Charcas, local magistrates, and caciques failed to resolve indigenous complaints in Chayanta, for example, a new breed of community activists, led by a commoner, Tomás Katari, saw no viable alternatives to violent rebellion. The destabilization of community political institutions and the failure of judicial options throughout the central and southern Andes also allowed these rebellions to expand well beyond their home provinces, encompassing much of Peru and Upper Peru. The principal restraint to the spread of Tupac Amaru's rebellion was his failure to recruit several strong regional ethnic leaders outside Tinta, such as Mateo García Pumacahua. In areas where the ethnic leadership had been weakened or discredited (as in much of Upper Peru), however, rebellion engulfed the landscape.

The move from resistance to violent rebellion demonstrated the emergence of a new Andean political consciousness by the 1780s. In Chayanta, Tomás Katari and his supporters fought for community rights, demanding that the Crown fulfill its reciprocal political compact with the Aymara peoples of Macha in return for indigenous loyalty, tribute payments, and mita obligations. Whenever civil authorities violated these norms of reciprocity, the Andeans felt compelled to rebel. In other regions, however, an even more coherent political consciousness emerged. The Inkari myth, predicting a return of the Inca to establish a new political order and replace the "bankrupt" colonial regime, exercised a strong hold over many of Tupac Amaru's followers in the Cusco region. These beliefs also resonated in Upper Peru during the rebellion of Tupac Katari. Whereas the messianic appeal of Juan

Santos Atahualpa remained confined to his followers in the Cerro de la Sal, forty years later this idea reverberated among creoles, castas, and Andeans, particularly in regions where colonial policies had caused serious political, social, and economic disruptions.

Although the restoration of a new Inca dynasty represented a heightened Andean political consciousness, the idea also meant different things to the various groups caught up in rebellion. For some creole, mestizo, and Anizo, and Andean elites, returning to a romanticized "classical" past endowed their people with an ancient national history, divorced from the Spanish colonial regime. For many of the Andean rank and file, however, a restored Inca dynasty apparently involved realizing more concrete political goals: an end to tribute, repabute, reparto, and mita obligations, and the expulsion of abusive puka kurve puka kunkas. While some leaders envisaged a new order loosely affiliated with the Spanish Crown, others wanted a completely independent Inca monarchy. Finally, Tupac Amaru wanted to establish a stratified social order headed by the Inca, but many other Andean rebels wanted to alter or even smash these hierarchical remnants of the old colonial heritage.


Despite these differences in political outlook and the failure of the Great Rebellions by 1783, Spanish authorities could never exterminate this Andean political consciousness. Litigiousness, protests, and rebellions continued from the 1780s through the independence era, even flaring up into periodic regional uprisings, such as the Pumacahua Revolt of 1814. Andeans also fought on both sides of the independence struggles through the 1820s. Assertions of indigenous political rights varied over time, yet they persisted. Indigenous rebels attempted to shape the formation of nineteenth-century nation-states in the Andes, and modern-day revolutionary movements still continue presenting different visions of political and social justice.

Not all forms of indigenous resistance and consciousness manifest themselves in protest movements or violent rebellions. Some take more subtle forms, like popular theater presentations, for example, such as the Quechua play *Tragedy of the Death of Atahualpa*

(*Atau Wallpaj P'uuchukuyunipa Wankan*), continue to express resistance by retaining links to the Andean past. Early versions of this drama may have been performed in the 1550s, but the most famous version of the play dates from the nineteenth century in Chayanta, the site of Tomás Katari's rebellion. Usually performed entirely in Quechua, the play depicts the first encounter between Pizarro and Atahualpa and the sequence of events leading to the Sapa Inca's execution by the conquistadors. It ends with the King of Spain rebuking Pizarro for killing the Inca: the conquistador then falls dead himself in retribution for the crime. The events depicted in the *Tragedy of the Death of Atahualpa* signal the end of a historical cycle or *pachacuti* in Quechua, a time when the world was turned upside down and power passed to the European invaders. Yet in Andean terms, this play also gives hope for a new revival, when the world will be righted (as promised in myths such as Inkari) and the indigenous peoples empowered once again. The "hidden messages" contained in popular theater performances or in more overt acts of political resistance allow Andeans to continue asserting their own vision of the past, present, and future.⁴⁴

8

CONCLUSION



WHEN ATAHUALPA ENTERED CENTERED CANAMARCA on 16 November 1532, he ruled the largest and most sophisticated indigenous empire in the Americas, but within a few thin a few hours he was a captive of foreign invaders who would ultimately destroy Tawantinsuyu. The once-powerful Sapa Inca had ruled a massive domain extending from his capital in Cusco through o through the patchwork of Andean highland valleys and across coastal tropical zones and desert plains. This empire also encompassed ampassed a kaleidoscope of ethnic groups, languages, and cultures, and tures, and its citizens had attained amazing achievements in art, technology, military sciences, and social organization. After the carnage he carnage at Cajamarca, however, this diverse Andean world underwent dramatic and irreversible transformations, which neither Atahualpa nor the Spanish invaders could have imagined. Over the course of three centuries, large numbers of European emigrants arrived in the Andes and initiated profound alterations in traditional Andean modes of production, technology, politics, religion, culture, and social hierarchies. At the same time, the indigenous peoples merged these changes with